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I. Introduction
Record imbalance has characterized the trade relationship be-
tween Japan and the United States during the late 1980s and early
1990s. While the United States trade deficit has declined from its
peak in 1987 of $59.8 billion,' it is still considered insufferably ex-
cessive. The recent course of the trade imbalance has not changed
the perception of excess; while the imbalance had fallen to $38 bil-
lion by 1990,2 it rose to $43.4 billion in 1991.3 The imbalance is
projected to reach approximately $50 billion in 1992, 4 a large part of
the $120 billion global trade surplus that Japan is expected to
amass .
5
The development of this situation is curious because the Japa-
nese economy is formally the most open of the major industrialized
economies. 6 However, far more troubling to both trade partners has
been the continuation of this situation.7 It has persisted despite the
I Michael W. Punke, The Structural Impediments to United States-Japanese Trade: The Colli-
sion of Culture and Law, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 55, 57 (1990).
2 History Suggests Caution Warranted on Japanese Promises, AP, Apr. 20, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP File.
3 Joel Kurtzman, Business Diary, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1992, § 3, p. 2.
4 Id.
5 Trading Words, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1992, World Report, at 1.
6 The average level ofJapanese tariffs on a trade-weighted basis is 2.3%. How Open
is Japan?, FOCUSJAPAN, Aug. 1, 1991.
7 From 1985 to 1989, Japanese imports of U.S. manufactured goods doubled to $45
billion. USTR Hills Rejects Calls in Congress for U.S. to "Manage" Trade with Japan, 7 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 681 (1990). Nevertheless, the U.S. trade deficit withJapan narrowed to
a lesser degree than did the trade deficits with other major trading partners. Between
1987 and 1989, the trade deficit of the United States with the world declined by 29%,
while that withJapan diminished by only 13%. Is There a U.S. -Japan Trade Problem? Look at
the Statistics, Bus. AM., Apr. 9, 1990, at 6. These recent increases in the trade deficit pre-
sage redoubled efforts to resolve trade difficulties. Kurtzman, supra note 3, at 2.
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elimination of most tariffs,8 the sharp fluctuation of exchange rates,
and the agreement to numerous trade initiatives and agreements by
both countries.9 The continuing imbalance has focused the collec-
tive mind of American policy makers in particular on the elimination
of the American trade deficit with Japan. Two schools of thought
shape American policy-making with respect to the trade deficit with
Japan. The first school advocates liberalized trade as the means to
eliminate impediments to foreign activity in theJapanese economy.' 0
The second school promotes managed trade as the means to guaran-
tee American access to a certain percentage of the Japanese market
in any single industry.'1  The influence of each school of thought is
evident in the seemingly schizophrenic American policy toward Ja-
8 Other than tariffs protecting agriculture and fisheries, Japanese tariff barriers have
been virtually eliminated. Of the twenty-one categories of tariffs which are still applicable,
only one applies to the manufacturing sector. The remaining tariffs apply to agriculture
and fisheries. The rice market is the most notoriously protected market in Japan. Like all
measures insulating inefficient domestic producers, the protection ofJapanese rice produ-
cers inflates the costs consumers must bear; in effect, Japanese citizens pay twice to inflate
rice prices - once in their capacities as taxpayers, for the payment of subsidies to domes-
tic producers, and a second time in their capacities as consumers for the purchase of artifi-
cially-expensive domestic rice. The total annual cost for rice market protection is
estimated at $800 per household. Isaac Shapiro & Constance C. Hamilton, How to Succeed
in Japan: Time for U.S. Firms to Focus on Post Entry Survival, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., May 15,
1990, at 8, 13. The U.S. trade authorities frequently point to the rice market as a major
source of trade friction between the two nations. Id. This is curious, indeed, as the reduc-
tion of tariff barriers to rice would benefit low-cost South-East Asian producers to a far
greater extent than it would benefit higher-cost American producers.
9 See Glenn Fukushima, United States -Japan Free Trade Area: A Skeptical View, 22 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 455 (1989). In 1987, Japan imported manufactured goods equivalent to
only 2.4% of its Gross National Product. Comparable figures for the United States and
West Germany, the other major trading economies, were 7.3% and 10.5%, respectively.
Id. at 456.
10 The Reagan-Bush years have seen successive U.S. administrations forcefully pro-
moting liberalized trade, though Congress has been less enamored of this policy. While
the vehicle for trade liberalization has been the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) since the end of World War II, the early 1990s has witnessed both the faltering of
the most recent Uruguay Round of the GATT and the reorientation of American liberal
trade policy away from multilateral arrangements, like GATT, and toward bilateral ar-
rangements like the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII). This increase in bilateralism
is likely a necessary precondition to the emergence of extensively managed bilateral trade
relations.
II In contrast to the absence of vociferous advocates of liberal trade policy, several
prominent authorities heartily advance managed trade and the reformation of U.S. trade
policy. See, e.g., CLYDE V. PRESTOwrrZ, TRADING PLACES: How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE
THE LEAD (1988); KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER: PEOPLE AND
POLITICS IN A STATELESS NATION (1989); Senator Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case
for Bilateral Agreements, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (Winter 1989).
While the liberalized trade school's attempts have been likened to the "levelling of a
playing field" in order to establish fair rules for competition, the managed trade school's
efforts have been analogized to the levering of a closed door through the use of a crowbar.
The continuing efforts of American negotiators to gain the benefits promised in one such
managed trade agreement is illustrative of the second school's approach. The agreement
between the United States and Japan with respect to the Japanese semi-conductor market,
the world's largest, allocates 20% of theJapanese market to American manufacturers. The
United States alleges it has attained only 14.6% of the market, falling far short of the
target market share agreed upon by the two nations.
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pan. The same U.S. Administration emphasized liberal trade in the
1990 signing of the Structural Impediments Initiative Agreement
(the Agreement)' 2 and then focused on managed trade in the 1992
ill-fated journey to Japan by President Bush.' 3
The Bush Administration mainly emphasized liberalized trade,
and more specifically, the Agreement, because the former President
himself was a powerful advocate of free trade. The Agreement is
founded on the mutual commitment of each partner to undertake the
necessary structural reforms that should make each economy more
competitive and its transactions more transparent.' 4 To achieve
these goals, the Agreement commits the parties to undertake steps
immediately t5 and to continue to meet in working groups. In the
final Agreement, Japan committed to certain measures including the
increased supervision and sanction of exclusionary business prac-
tices 16 and the expanded monitoring of the keiretsu, 17 Japan's distinc-
12 Andrew Pollack, A Tentative Japan is Giving Trust-Busting a Try, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
1992, at B1; Anthony Rowley, Shuffling the Deck, FAR E. ECON. REV. July 19, 1990, at 42.
The final Joint Report of the Structural Impediments Initiative was issued following the
last session of SII talks onJune 28, 1990. See Key Elements of U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments
Initiative Joint Report Released by USTR, June 28, 1990, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1014
(1990) [hereinafter Key Elements of the Agreement]. Pursuant to the final Agreement, ongoing
negotiations continue. At the July 27, 1992 meetings, the negotiators struggled to elimi-
nate continuing sticking points. For a discussion of these negotiations, see Rowley, supra,
at 42; Pollack, supra at BI.
13 See Paul Blusten, Bush's Trip to Japan Sets in Motion Shift Toward "Managed" Trade,
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1992, at A22; Leonard Silk, Economic Scene: A Time of Peril For World
Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1992, at D2. The increasingly vociferous advocates of managed
trade between the United States and Japan coerced President Bush to assume his ill-con-
ceived, trade-oriented journey to Japan in January 1992. This journey achieved little and
heightened international trade tension, providing a visual symbol for the collapse of
American firms in the face of Japanese competitors. Blusten, supra at A22; Silk, supra at
D2. The trip drew to an unceremonious close when the President of the United States
slumped into the lap ofJapanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and vomited. This image
was conveyed to millions of viewers in both nations and likely increased the hostility
through which many Americans express their frustration at the seemingly indefatigable
Japanese.
14 The Agreement constitutes an unprecedented bid at the solution of difficulties in
international trade. It seeks to remove enduring nontariff barriers through the adoption
of salutary macroeconomic policies intended to "level the playing field" between the two
countries. This phrase succinctly expresses American perceptions of the foundations of
the trade imbalance. In the American view, the rules by which each party is playing the
"trade game" differ. By establishing common rules and thereby levelling the field of com-
petition, the Americans hope to redress the trade imbalance.
15 The Japanese Government promised to examine and remedy six features of the
Japanese economy: savings and investment, land use and reform, the distribution system,
exclusionary business practices, industrial structure, and price levels. See Key Elements of the
Agreement, supra note 12, at 1015-16.
16 Id. at 1014. Substantial revision of these practices, to allow for increased access to
the Japanese market, has been agreed upon. The steps to be taken include an increase in
the penalties and surcharges which violators are required to pay under the Act Concerning
Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, No. 54 (Japan 1947),
amended by No. 214 (1949), amended by No. 259 (1953), amended by No. 63 (1977), amended
(1982) [hereinafter Anti-Monopoly Law or AML], translated in HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI
UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAws OF JAPAN (1983). In addition, exemptions from the
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tive corporate groupings.18 Japan will carry out its promises
primarily under its antitrust statute, the Anti-Monopoly Law
(AML).19
American efforts in the continuing Structural Impediments Initi-
ative meetings have been directed at the examination of Japanese
industrial relationships in general, and the keiretsu in particular.
United States negotiators advocate enhanced monitoring in order to
expose activities and relationships that are injurious to competi-
tion.20 To alleviate anticompetitiveness inherent in such activities
and relationships, American negotiators advance measures which
would facilitate the deconstruction and redesign of industrial rela-
tionships;2 1 chief among these measures is the application of Japa-
nese competition law.
It is not clear that Japanese antitrust law could be convincingly
used as a mechanism to facilitate deconstruction of industrial rela-
tionships. Even if such an application were possible in theory, in
practice it would be subject to two caveats. First, the Japanese anti-
AML which allow companies to establish cartels in order to jointly withstand harsh eco-
nomic climates will be minimized. The Japan Fair Trade Commission (FTC) will be fur-
ther empowered through an increase in FTC personnel and investigatory resources. The
FTC will also be required to take more vigorous, formal action and to apply criminal sanc-
tions more readily against schemes for price-fixing, bid-rigging, supply restraints, and
group boycotts. Private remedies will be made more effective under the AML, with strong
FTC enforcement to ensure the successful commencement of actions. In addition, the
patent examination process will be improved both through a shortening of the approval
time to twenty-four months and through an increase in the number of patent examiners.
More transparency will be introduced into the provision of administrative guidance to en-
sure that it does not restrict market access or fair competition. Similarly, more trans-
parency will be encouraged in the procurement of supplies by private Japanese companies.
For an informal summary of the provisions of the Structural Impediments Initiative Joint
Report, see Key Elements of the Agreement, supra note 12, at 1015-16.
17 The proper name of the groups that are popularly referred to as keiretsu is keiretsu
kaisha (affiliated companies). Because they are amorphous, keiretsu are not easily described.
The many attempts made in defining these corporate groups facilitate the understanding
of their complex nature. For a general discussion of keiretsu, see Angelina Helou, The Na-
ture and Competitiveness of Japan's Keiretsu, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 99 (1991); Yasuo Fujigane,
Financial Keiretsu Strengthen Solidarity, TOKYO Bus. TODAY, Feb. 1991, at 26; Inside the
Charmed Circle, EcONOMIST, Jan. 5, 1991, at 54; Yasuo Fujigane & Peter Ennis, Keiretsu: What
Are They Doing, Where Are They Heading?, TOKYO Bus. TODAY, Sept. 1990, at 26; Intimate Links
Within Japan's Corporate Groups, TOKYO Bus. TODAY, Jan. 1989, at 14.
18 Key Elements of the Agreement, supra note 12, at 1014. Where necessary, supervision
and modification of the conduct of the keiretsu is to begin. Greater transparency of, and
fairness in, intercorporate relations are to be fostered by the Japanese government. To
encourage this, the AML and the FTC are being strengthened, offensive cross-sharehold-
ing arrangements are to be restricted, and disclosure and reporting requirements are to
become more stringent. Id.
19 AML, supra note 16. See also infra Part III.A.
20 Peter B. Maretz, Antimonopoly Enforcement, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Oct. 15, 1990, at 8;
Hideki Ogawa, Strengthening Japan's Anti-Monopoly Regulations, WORLD COMPETITION, March
1991, at 67.
21 See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 12, at BI (indicating the continuing importance of this
strategy in American trade policy); Loosen Keiretsu Structures: U.S. Urges Japan at SII Talks,
MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, May 23, 1991, at 1.
1993]
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trust enforcement body, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (FTC),22
is woefully understaffed. Under present circumstances, it is incapa-
ble of assuming a significantly heavier case load. 23 Second, enforce-
ment measures may only be undertaken in conformity with the
nature of the law and legal culture inJapan. Consensualism and con-
ciliation govern the administration of Japanese law.2 4 In the context
of these Japanese cultural norms, 25 it is uncertain whether vigorous
antitrust enforcement would effect the change American policy mak-
ers anticipate.
The applicability of Japanese antitrust law is therefore the criti-
cal determination: the caveats mentioned above would merely mold
the actual enforcement. The relevance of the law, itself, rests on two
findings. First, anticompetitive behavior and relationships must be
identified. The initial section of this Article focuses on this identifi-
cation through the description ofJapanese industrial structures, with
reference to the keiretsu in particular, and their effects on the markets
for goods and services.
Second, Japanese antitrust law must control any identified in-
stances of anticompetitive activities. The latter section of this Article
concerns a multi-stage analysis of this issue. The elements of Japa-
nese competition law that are relevant to this analysis are outlined.
Subsequently, these legal premises are applied to typical corporate
conduct to test the restrictive effects, if any, of the law, particularly in
the context of normative Japanese legal culture. Finally, the Article's
conclusion seriously questions the rationality of American hopes for
dismantling particular Japanese industrial structures such as the
keirelsu through the extensive, forceful application of Japanese com-
petition law.
22 For a discussion of the history and operation of the FTC, see IYORI & UESUGI, supra
note 16, at 119-21.
23 See Nigel Holloway, Freeing the Watchdog, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 19, 1989, at 48.
While efforts were made to raise the number of FTC inspectors from approximately 125 in
1990 to 160 in 1992, the staffing levels remain inadequate to tackle allegedly pervasive
anticompetitive activities in the Japanese economy.
24 Punke, supra note 1, at 77-78 (comparing the U.S. approach to trade relations,
which emphasizes "coercive legal regulation," to Japan's system, which stresses "informal,
consensual restriction," and contrasting the U.S. adversarial judicial system to the Japa-
nese judicial system, which is based on conciliation and mediation).
25 The objective of "levelling the playing field" is founded on American legal norms
where the law rigidly structures societal arrangements. This legal norm has no parallel in
Japan; Japanese legal norms conceive of law as a tool only for government intervention in
society, in the absence of which societal arrangements are consensual and are far more
fluid. SeeJohn 0. Haley,Japanese Antitrust Enforcement: Implications for United States Trade, 18
N. Ky. L. REV. 335 (1991) (discussing the norms defining the Japanese legal system) [here-
inafter Haley,Japanese Antitrust Enforcement]; John 0. Haley, Luck, Law, Culture and Trade: The
Intractability of United States-Japan Trade Conflict, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 403, 416-22 (1989)
(discussing Japanese attitudes towards law, the state, and consensual governance) [herein-
after Haley, Luck, Law, Culture & Trade]. The attempted imposition of fair rules of the
game may represent a radical misunderstanding of Japan and the potential impact of the
Agreement in Japan.
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II. Anticompetitive Behavior
A. Introduction
In order to make the first determination, the existence of an-
ticompetitive practices, two elements of the architecture of Japanese
industrial relationships must be distinguished. First, the current
structure of corporate relationships must be found to negatively af-
fect competition in the Japanese market. Second, if it is determined
that the structure of relationships negatively affects competition
through a reduction in market access, the cause of this reduced mar-
ket access must still be established; antitrust law can be successfully
applied toward the modification of industrial relationships only if
they constitute actionable anticompetitive behaviour.
The first element in this determination, the reduction of compe-
tition, was established in a recent study conducted by Robert Law-
rence. This study indicates that the structure of Japanese industry is
statistically significant with respect to the levels of imports and ex-
ports in the Japanese economy. Keiretsu of all sorts were found to
reduce market access for imports. 2 6 However, the establishment of
the first element, reduced market access, need not imply the second
necessary element, actionable anticompetitiveness. Instead, it may
indicate the greater efficiency of Japanese industry which fosters the
tendency of Japanese firms to purchase from other Japanese firms
and not from foreign firms. In the alternative, it may simply result
from the widespread application of the principle of freedom of con-
tract, which allows any economic entity the right to transact with an-
other economic entity of its choice. Thus, the preference of many
Japanese firms for transactions with other Japanese firms may nega-
tively affect import levels without constituting an anticompetitive
practice.2 7
The second finding, that of actionable anticompetitive beha-
viour, therefore, is critical. Lawrence attempted to ascertain the de-
gree of anticompetitiveness by comparing keiretsu effects on export
levels to keiretsu effects on import levels. He found that only one type
of keiretsu fostered greater export levels, and this type did so only
moderately. He interpreted this lack of enhanced exportation as an
indication that keiretsu did not enjoy significantly greater efficiency.
As a result, he speculated that reduced import levels and unaffected
export levels may result from the anticompetitiveness of keiretsu
relationships 28
Lawrence's conclusion is by no means certain. The failure of the
keiretsu to heighten exports in a statistically significant manner may
26 Robert Z. Lawrence, Efficient or Exclusionist? The Import Behavior of Japanese Corporate
Groups, I BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. AcTivrr 311 (1991).
27 Id.
28 Id.
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indicate nothing more than the application of the freedom of con-
tract principle. Speculative musings over comprehensive economic
statistics are inadequate bases for a determination of legally actiona-
ble anticompetitiveness. The evaluation of anticompetitiveness rests
on the characterization of actual keiretsu practices as anticompetitive,
if they indeed are so.
B. Keiretsu Practices
The keiretsu are amorphous corporate groupings that are unique
to Japan because they are, in large part, the product of the Japanese
setting in which they have developed. 29 Two overall distinguishing
features, one structural, the other operational, define the nature of
the keiretsu and integrate their disparate memberships. These inte-
grating features comprise an intricate web of relationships and ex-
tensive relational contracting and pooling of resources.
1. Structural Elements
The keiretsu are associations which are the outcome of a complex
interweaving of relationships on the levels of both the corporation
and the individual.30 On both planes, the ties that bind the relevant
parties endure in the long term and infuse their entire relationship.
On the level of the corporation, these ties constitute any of several
interconnections, including intra-keiretsu financing, intercorporate
shareholding, and interlocking executive structures and corporate
directorates. Each of these interconnections is conceived as a means
by which to achieve greater operational cohesion, rather than as an
end in itself.5 l On the level of the individual, these ties include inter-
29 Yasuhiro Hasegawa, The Keiretsu System in a Diferent Perspective, TOKYO Bus. TODAY,
Nov. 1991, at 58. The importance of the context in which the keiretsu system has developed
should not be minimized. They are outgrowths of the collaborative nature of Japanese
society.
An interesting theory has been advanced by one author, who asserts that the keiretsu
system is simply a modernized form of the Japanese feudal system. Id. This theory is
presented by way of metaphor in which the parallels between the keiretsu and their feudal
predecessors are drawn. The keiretsu companies are compared to the han, the groups of
aristocratic samurai, each headed by a feudal lord, termed the daimyo. The daimyo is analo-
gized to the company president, because of the great power wielded within the group.
Certain han were linked horizontally with one another, as are companies in modern hori-
zontal keiretsu. The lives of the samurai were dependent on the efforts of the merchants and
farmers, like the reliance of principal manufacturers on modern-day sub-contractors in
vertical keiretsu. Today, manufacturers try to maximize their profit margins at the expense
of their vertically linked subcontractors and distributors; in feudal Japan, samurai similarly
tried to extract the maximum amounts of money and rice from the merchants and farmers,
respectively. The final stage of the earlier version of the feudal system was the cause of the
end of the bakufu-han system - the forcible opening of Japan by the Americans. It is not
yet clear whether this, too, will have a modern parallel. For a greater elaboration and
discussion of this metaphor, see id.
30 Helou, supra note 17, at 99-100, 100 n.5.
31 Inside the Charmed Circle, supra note 17, at 54. The effects of these mechanisms in-
clude the removal of approximately 70% of all shares of companies traded on the Tokyo
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personal contacts that are maintained by the elements of individual
interaction that accompany the corporate ties.
a. Financial Links
Intra-keiretsu financing includes both debt and equity financing.
Debt financing within a keiretsu is provided by several firms central to
the keiretsu organization, comprising banks, manufacturing concerns,
and international trading companies (sogo shosha).32 Banks associated
with keiretsu companies provide debt financing in the form of loans.
Manufacturing and international trading firms within a keiretsu pro-
vide trade credit that, like the direct loans extended by keiretsu banks,
finances other keiretsu firms. 33 This arrangement meets the needs of
both parties to the financing. From the point of view of the financing
firm, debt financing allows the financing firms extensive input into
the operations of the financed firms. From the perspective of the
financed firm, the credit extension is appealing because it provides
access to otherwise unattainable financial resources and provides a
tax advantage. 34
Equity financing is provided by many firms within a keiretsu
through the common practice of intercorporate shareholding. Sev-
eral keiretsu companies assume minority stakes in a target keiretsu firm
using this mechanism. 35 The assumption by many keiretsu companies
of similar minority stakes in other keiretsu firms creates a bewildering
network of cross-shareholdings within each corporate grouping.
Rarely do any of these stakes exceed five to ten percent of the out-
standing equity of a firm because the primary purpose of this cross-
shareholding is the creation of an intercorporate bond, rather than
the investment of equity capital oriented toward ownership or a re-
turn on capital. 36
From the perspective of the firm in which shares are held, the
Stock Exchange from circulation on the market and the exclusion of outsiders from the
corporate boards of the relevant companies. These are mere unintended side effects of
these inter-relationships which are, as noted, intended merely to fortify relationships. Id.
32 Each of these firms is a principal member of the keiretsu with which they are affili-
ated. Because of their central financing position and their long-term investment of debt
capital in member firms, banks are often considered the most important players in the
keiretsu. Manufacturing concerns assume a similar importance, particularly in those keiretsu
which are organized around the operations of a central manufacturing process. Interna-
tional trading companies, as the outlet of the keiretsu to the world and a secondary source
of financing, are also accorded a respected position in keiretsu. See sources cited supra note
17.
33 Helou, supra note 17, at 111-12.
34 Interest expenses are deductible from gross revenue and thereby reduce the
amount of taxable income. In contrast, dividends, the analogous payment to equity inves-
tors, are paid out of after-tax income and therefore are a less tax-efficient form of financ-
ing. Id. at 107, 111-12.
35 Making Foreigners Cross, EcONOMIST, Aug. 19, 1989, at 62.
36 Minoru Nakazato, Tax Reform in Japan: An International Perspective in an Overview, 7
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 74 (1990).
19931
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shareholding provides both equity capital to the firm and establishes
a connection between the firm and other keiretsu companies. From
the point of view of the investing company, the practice of cross-
shareholding has several benefits, including a tax advantage and cor-
porate control. The taxation regime provides preferential treatment
of capital gains and intercorporate dividends, the two forms of direct
return on equity;3 7 the tax-related advantage of returns on equity
over returns on debt encourages corporate equity investment. How-
ever, the shareholding is not undertaken primarily as a vehicle for
short-term return on equity. Contracting with related firms consti-
tutes the effective return earned by investing firms on their cross-
held shares3 8 because they actually receive little return in the form of
dividends.39
In addition, cross-shareholding allows effective control of keiretsu
firms to pass to the shareholding firms and, in particular, to the cen-
tral keiretsu companies. Few keiretsu companies are majority-owned by
any one company. This allows effective control of keiretsu members
to be established through the extensive cross-shareholding among a
number of keiretsu companies. The reliance of many of the smaller
affiliates on the larger banking, trading, and manufacturing con-
37 The practice of extensive share ownership receives some support from the Income
Tax Act, which taxes capital gains at a lesser rate and excludes intercorporate dividends, in
part or in whole, from taxable corporate income. Id. Prior to 1988, corporate dividends
received from other domestic corporations could be fully excluded from taxable income.
Reforms of the Income Tax Act which took effect commencing April 1, 1989, reduced the
exclusion from taxable income of dividends from domestic corporations. For sharehold-
ings of less than 25% of outstanding shares, the maximum exclusion was reduced to 80%;
for larger shareholdings, though, the exclusion remains at 100%. Even in the aftermath of
the reforms, the effect of this law has been the encouragement of large-scale, domestic,
intercorporate share-holding. Id.
Its importance is less than it might be in the Anglo-American economies because of
the relatively small dividends typical ofJapanese companies. The long-term, interlocking
nature of Japanese shareholding allows Japanese firms to distribute only a small part of
their earnings as dividends and to retain the vast majority for reinvestment. Japanese tax
law favors the retention of profits rather than the payment of dividends by providing that
the capitals gains from sales of securities are tax free. Id. at 74. Investor returns on equity
portfolios in the form of dividends, therefore, are limited. Keiretsu companies, instead,
receive a return on their equity investment in the form of profitable, ongoing business
relationships, rather than dividends.
38 This form of return on investment is actually more efficient than returns in the
form of dividends. Dividend income is subject to double taxation, at the level of the firm
issuing the dividend and at the level of the ultimate recipient of the income. In contrast,
return in the form of operational business relationships is subject to taxation only at the
level of the ultimate recipient of the income; the corporation paying for the relationship
pays no tax on its business expenditures.
The advantage of dividend income as a return on investment is that dividend income
is easily isolated and quantified. In contrast, business transactions may have resulted even
in the absence of the investing firm's equity investment. Typical Anglo-American dividend
return foregoes the tax efficiencies, at least in part, in order to ease the quantification of
return on investment. Making Foreigners Cross, supra note 35, at 62.
39 Cries have risen for an increase in dividend levels from their current paltry
amounts. Dividends paid by Japan's larger companies currently average only about 1% of
annual income. Id.
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cerns, in particular, grants these latter companies a much greater say
in the conduct of their smaller affiliates than their small shareholding
would otherwise allow.40 Although the involvement of these larger
firms may affect the decision-making of smaller affiliates, it also pro-
vides stability to each company and effectively eliminates the possi-
bility of a hostile takeover of the company. 4'
In return for the benefits accruing to them, smaller firms are
often constrained to accept the "leading role" of the larger affiliate
firms and financial institutions.42 These large firms, particularly the
affiliated banks, manufacturing companies, and international trading
companies, undertake the coordination and integration of functions
typically associated with holding companies in Western countries.43
The most important roles assumed include capital investment and
production integration. The notion of wa (harmony) that permeates
Japanese culture thereby directly impacts on keiretsu practices be-
cause the central companies facilitate the harmonious integration of
the diverse resources and functions of the keiretsu firms. 44
b. Managerial Links
Interlocking corporate executives and directorates are con-
structed through the exchange of corporate executives and directors.
These structures not only foster personal integration through per-
sonal networking, but also engender intra-keiretsu long-term strategic
cooperation and short-term operational integration. 45 The intro-
duction of outsider input into individual firm decisions enables the
strategic cooperation and operational integration. Because this
method of influence is undetectable, its impact is unclear. It is likely
that intercorporate strategic or operational integration is facilitated
only when it is to the economic advantage of each of the coordinat-
ing companies. 46
40 Fujigane & Ennis, supra note 17, at 26.
41 This practice removes all but 25-30% of the shares of many corporations from the
marketplace and, thereby, facilitates the manipulation of the prices of outstanding shares.
Making Foreigners Cross, supra note 35, at 62. However, the ongoing collapse of Japanese
equity markets, as evidenced by the fall of the Nikkei Stock Index from its 1989 heights of
close to 40,000 to its August 18, 1992 nadir of 14,309 may compelJapanese firms suffering
liquidity crises or continuing losses to dispose of large blocks of shares held in keiretsu
member companies. Going Nowhere, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1992, at 84.
42 The identity of these integrating firms varies with the nature of the keiretsu. These
firms include lead banks, large manufacturing concerns, and sogo shosha (international trad-
ing companies). See sources cited supra note 17.
43 Article 9 of the Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law forbids holding companies. AML,
supra note 16, ch. IV, § 9, translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 222-26.
44 Helou, supra note 17, at 119.
45 Fujigane, supra note 17, at 28.
46 Robert Neff& WilliamJ. Holstein, Mighty Mitsubishi is on the Move, Bus. WK., Sept.
24, 1990, at 98.
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2. Operational Elements
In addition to being an intricate web of relationships structur-
ally, the keiretsu are operational affiliations of companies that engage
in extensive intra-keiretsu contracting for goods and services. Rela-
tional contracting among member firms enables the traffic of goods
within a keiretsu. Similarly, the passage of services through the keiretsu
is engineered by substantial interfirm pooling of resources. Both of
these forms of intra-keiretsu dealings are important to the cost mini-
mization efforts of the keiretsu.
a. Operational Links
Long-term relational contracting is a transactional practice
through which supplies are purchased from, or sold to, related com-
panies. This form of contracting, motivated by the long-term rela-
tionships that bind keiretsu companies, pervades all keiretsu
relationships. However, it does not characterize all keiretsu company
purchases; while most keiretsu company purchases are made from
other keiretsu companies, many transactions are made with non-
keiretsu companies. 47
Like all economic actors, keiretsu companies are concerned with
the fundamentally sound economics militating in favour of cost mini-
mization. Although this might suggest, prima facie, a willingness of
keiretsu companies to go outside the keiretsu to procure lowest cost
items, a preference for intra-keiretsu dealings remains;48 goods of
similar quality and cost available both within and without a keiretsu
will almost always be sourced from within the group.49 Intra-keiretsu
transactions will be foregone only when preferential intra-keiretsu
transactions would occur at the expense of economically advanta-
geous dealings with non-keiretsu firms. The seeming inconsistency of
these two predispositions, toward cost minimization and intra-keiretsu
reciprocal dealing, must be understood in the context of the long-
term time horizon shared by keiretsu firms.50 This long-term perspec-
47 Intra-keiretsu dealing has been reduced in its relative scope. While it still dominates
the purchases of keiretsu firms, it no longer excludes outside companies from supplying
keiretsu firms. See infra note 282.
48 Examples of these preferred dealings are legion, but sometimes the most mundane
are the most striking. As an example, employees of Mitsubishi companies are restricted in
their place of business to purchasing beer produced by the affiliated Kirin brewery, while
employees of Sumitomo firms are similarly limited to purchasing the output of Asahi brew-
ery. Fujigane, supra note 17, at 30.
49 Id.
50 No description of the keiretsu is complete without a juxtaposition of stereotypical
characteristics -Japanese long-termism and American short-termism. It is presumed that
American attitudes, summed up in the notion of "What have you done for me lately?",
constrain business relations to accord entirely with the short-term ability of suppliers and
related companies to provide low-cost inputs to American companies.
In contrast, Japanese attitudes emphasize the cultivation of relationships in the long-
term and discourage the formation of business relations solely on the basis of short-term
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tive prevents concern with cost minimization in the short-term from
overwhelming other concerns. Consequently, keiretsu firms often
forego the short-term cost minimization achieved through the
purchase of lower cost items of acceptable quality from non-keiretsu
companies.5
Instead, keiretsu firms will purchase goods from within a keiretsu
in order to assist a keiretsu affiliate in the production of goods52 of
cost and quality at least equal to that produced by the competitor
non-keiretsu firm. 53 This course allows keiretsu firms to attain the
long-term cost minimization which is available through the reduction
not only of production costs, 54 but also of transaction costs and un-
certainty costs.
Intra-keiretsu reciprocal dealings help reduce these last two forms
of cost. Transaction costs are associated with constant renegotiation
of contractual relationships and amendment of contracts in the event
of changes in circumstance. Similarly, uncertainty costs are created
by the company's need to garner information about contracting firms
and the markets in which they are active. The minimization of these
costs results from the entry into long-term relationships with affili-
ated firms, the close operational relationship between the firms, and
the desire of the firms to collaborate in order to optimize their
shared efforts.
Thus, because of the lasting benefit of intra-keiretsu expertise, re-
ciprocal dealings provide a greater degree of cost minimization than
does the short-term cost reduction effected by purchases of inexpen-
sive goods from non-keiretsu firms; purchases of the latter sort lower
production costs but do not reduce transaction costs and uncertainty
costs. Therefore, a keiretsu firm will choose to transact with a non-
keiretsu company only when that non-keiretsu firm produces a product
that offers a cost or quality advantage unattainable within the
keiretsu.5 5
This approach ensures the stability of keiretsu companies and in-
tercorporate ventures because it guarantees keiretsu firms that they
will retain their keiretsu clientele, regardless of most short-term cost
input price considerations. The Japanese guideline makete katsu, which means "lose now
but win a lot eventually", shapes this long-term outlook. For more discussion of the rele-
vance of Japanese cultural notions to the conduct of business, see George Palmer, Trans-
ferred to Tokyo - A Guide to Etiquette in the Land of the Rising Sun, 4 MULTINATIONAL Bus. 36
(1991).
51 Punke, supra note 1, at 63 (discussing the reliance of keiretsu on relational con-
tracting); Haley, Law, Luck, Culture & Trade, supra note 25, at 418.
52 Haley, Law, Luck, Culture, & Trade, supra note 25, at 418.
5 This approach prevents both gains in market share by outside companies and un-
coordinated changes in price by affiliates.
54 This is the sole source of short-term cost minimization through non-keiretsu
purchases.
55 Where the non-keiretsu firm possesses patented products or proprietary technology
or knowledge, a keiretsu firm will often choose to transact with it.
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disadvantages. In return, keiretsu firms are expected to expend all
necessary effort to achieve cost reductions and quality enhancement.
Empirically, the preference of keiretsu firms for dealing with other
companies within the keiretsu limits the gains in market share
available to companies outside the keiretsu. However, this keiretsu
preference does not completely exclude dealings with outside
companies .56
b. Resource-Pooling Links
The keiretsu structure facilitates the pooling of resources by
member firms. Within the keiretsu resources are amassed, developed,
distributed, and utilized by keiretsu affiliates. 57 For example, produc-
tion companies, collectively, serve as a repository for operations and
process expertise. Financial service companies similarly serve as a
collective pool of financial resources. These pools and others like
them are accessible to keiretsu members.
In general, keiretsu variously serve as repositories of human re-
sources, informational and technological resources, 58 including pro-
duction expertise, and financial resources. 59 Most of these resources
would be unattainable for the member firms in the absence of the
keiretsu. Access to these resources allows keiretsu firms stability far be-
yond that attainable by member firms standing alone.
i. Human Resources
High quality human resources are among the most difficult to
procure because managerial talent and employee skills must be
honed through training programs and actual experience. The lim-
ited experiences of many firms prevent the development of managers
and employees equipped to deal with all of the exigencies that may
confront their firms. The keiretsu relationship with other firms whose
managers or workers may have gained the requisite experience al-
lows young firms access to the necessary human resources at times
when these firms are unable to provide it themselves. These linkages
56 Because keiretsu arrangements are so fluid and overlapping, it is difficult to describe
with any degree of precision the extent of intra-keiretsu purchases. Empirical evidence indi-
cates that Aeiretsu companies are open to purchases from nonaffiliate companies. One sur-
vey indicated that intra-keiretsu trade in goods accounted for 70.4% of consumer good
supplies and 62.7% of capital good supplies. Fujigane & Ennis, supra note 17, at 30.
While this indicates there is scope for non-heiretsu firm dealings with keiretsu members, only
a small portion of keiretsu needs are satisfied by firms external to the keiretsu system.
Anecdotal evidence also weighs in this direction. In reference to Japanese transplant
automotive factories in the United States, one Japanese auto company executive explained
principles guiding supply procurement: "First choice is a keiretsu company, second is a
Japanese supplier, third is a local company." Carla Rapoport & Sally Solo, Why Japan Keeps
on Winning, FORTUNE, July 15, 1991, at 76.
57 Helou, supra note 17, at 114.
58 Haley, Japanese Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 25, at 359.
59 Helou, supra note 17, at 112-14.
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allow firms greater latitude in determining their human resource
procurement and deployment strategies. When necessary, human
resources may be sourced from outside affiliates. Similarly, when the
human resource requirements of firms diminish, employees and ex-
ecutives may be deployed at other keiretsu firms. 60
ii. Informational And Technological Resources
Customer information, 6' production technology, 62 and research
and development are among the many elements of informational and
technological resources. Only limited amounts of these resources
would be available to most firms in the absence of any interfirm pool-
ing arrangement. The extensive cost of developing and exploiting
these resources is often beyond the limited capacities of individual
firms. For example, specialized expertise in production processes,
financing, marketing and distribution possessed by individual firms
within a keiretsu may prove valuable to other firms within a keiretsu.
Without access to this expertise, these other firms would have to as-
sume significant development and deployment costs.63 These costs,
associated with new product or process research, innovation, and de-
velopment frequently would be prohibitively expensive. As a mem-
ber of a keiretsu, however, part or all of the expense and associated
risk64 may be dispersed over several participating keiretsu firms inter-
ested in the same research in operations and products.
The informational, technological, and financial resources avail-
able within the keiretsu allow for large interfirm investments in inno-
vative developments of benefit to the entire system of firms. 65 The
60 It is these relations, in part, which permit large Japanese companies to commit
themselves to their vaunted life-long employment practices. Human resources which be-
come superfluous may be shifted to affiliated companies. However, small affiliates are
often required to bear the excess cost created by this practice, as their employment levels
must vary radically in order to accommodate the needs of their larger affiliates.
The onset of recession in the Japanese real economy and the refusal of Japan's trade
partners to absorb increased levels ofJapanese exports that might allow Japan to temper
the domestic recession have prompted corporate Japan to reassess its values, particularly
regarding employment practices. No longer is the pursuit of market share, at the expense
of overworking the Japanese labour force blindly accepted. See Leaner and Meaner, ECONO-
MIST, July 11, 1992, at 66 (noting that companies are seeking lessened work hours). The
influential head of Sony Corporation, Akio Morita, among others, has pressed for a reduc-
tion in Japanese annual work hours from an average of 2100 hours per year to 1800 hours
per year. Id.
61 Information about customers and their individual needs is valuable for the devel-
opment of production standards and marketing programs.
62 Technology developed by one firm within a keiretsu may prove extremely valuable
to many keiretsu affiliates. The technology and the process may be adaptable to the needs
of several keiretsu firms.
63 Helou, supra note 17, at 110.
64 Yoshihiko Shimizu et al, Production Keiretsu: A New Export from Japan, TOKYO Bus.
TODAY, Sept. 1990, at 30; Haley, Japanese Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 25, at 359.
65 This analysis ignores the more complex issue of inter-keiretsu cooperation on basic
research prior to the stage of application of technology, which raises further competition
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importance of this reciprocal access to expertise is increased by
economy-wide keiretsu affiliation, which fosters massive competition
for innovation in operations and products within the Japanese
economy.66
iii. Financial Resources
The collection of financial resources within the keiretsu may in-
clude equity capital invested by keiretsu members through intercorpo-
rate shareholding, debt financing provided by affiliated banks, 67 and
trade credit extended by other keiretsu members. Financial resources,
which would otherwise be beyond the capacities of all but the largest
affiliate companies and financial institutions, are placed by the keiretsu
policy concerns. The encouragement of cooperative inter-keiretsu basic research by Japan's
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has been cited as one source forJapa-
nese success in semiconductor production. When American producers attempted a similar
arrangement, it was deemed anticompetitive. The initial American governmental resist-
ance to cooperative research efforts among competitor firms has dissipated in the face of
continued Japanese success and U.S. industry's complaints about an unfair disadvantage.
The semiconductor and automobile industries provide only two recent examples of grow-
ing cooperation in basic research. Gail DeGeorge et al., Learning From Japan, Bus. WEEK,
Jan. 27, 1992, at 52.
66 The intensity of competition and the pools of financial resources available within
keiretsu foster the rapid innovation associated with successful Japanese industries. For ex-
ample, companies in the automotive industry are able to design, develop, and produce
new car models in forty-three months; in contrast, until recently it has taken American car
companies sixty-three months to complete the same process. Hasegawa, supra note 29, at
59-60. Of course, other factors contribute to this speed. In the case of new automobile
development, the "shaken" system of automobile inspection and the associated expense of
car weight taxes, insurance premiums, and repair charges motivate new car purchases by
Japanese consumers in advance of inspections. Because these inspections are required
three years after purchase, consumers often trade in their cars in advance of this time.
This provides great incentive for car companies to rapidly develop new models. Id.
67 The highly-leveraged financial structures that many keiretsu firms possess as a result
of the availability of long-term bank debt financing allow keiretsu firms certain advantages.
Among these are the tax advantages granted by the exclusion of interest expenses from
taxable income. In addition, constant interest payments allow companies a measure of
certainty with respect to their financing costs and facilitate long-term strategic planning.
Once again, recent events have overtaken the Aeiretsu system. The Japanese banking
system has been thrown into complete disarray by the confluence of asset price deflation
and the coming into effect of the Final International Risk-Based Capital Standards
Adopted by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations, commonly known as the Basle
Accord. COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS & SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, FINAL INT'L
RISK-BASED CAPITAL STANDARDS ADOPTED BY THE BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGS.
(1988) [hereinafter BASLE ACCORD], reprinted in 51 BANKING REP. (BNA) 143 (July 25,
1988). The collapse of Japanese financial asset prices has sharply reduced the value of
Aeiretsu bank cross-shareholdings that served as the storehouse for much of the banking
system's capital. In addition, falling property prices have threatened the very viability of
banks and other financial institutions that are heavily exposed to the property market
through extensive property lending. The capital held by each such institution has fallen as
a result of reductions in reserves held in the form of share portfolios or large amounts of
bad debt owed by defaulting property borrowers. This decline in capital reserves has de-
veloped concurrently with the application of the Basle Accord's requirements that capital
be adjusted on a risk-weighted basis to reflect the true riskiness of a bank's loan portfolio.
BASLE ACCORD, reprinted in 51 BANKING REP. (BNA) at 146-49. These events cannot be
neutral in their impact on keiretsu financing practices.
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structure at the disposal of all companies within the grouping. Ac-
cess to these finances allows keiretsu affiliates both a degree of finan-
cial stability and an ability to engage in long-term planning denied to
non-keiretsu companies. In addition, the pooling of these financial
resources may facilitate the most efficient allocation of financial re-
sources to those firms within the keiretsu able to provide the highest
long-term return on investment.68
C. Types of Keiretsu
1. Introduction
Consideration of the keiretsu mandates the development of a ty-
pology to facilitate a more detailed analysis. However, several char-
acteristics of keiretsu render the development of a typology very
difficult. Although defining the elements of these corporate groups
is possible, identifying the existence of actual keiretsu is less easily ac-
complished. The varying degrees of corporate integration, the fluid-
ity of keiretsu arrangements, and the interconnection of different sorts
of keiretsu all contribute to this difficulty.69
Integration among keiretsu companies and between keiretsu com-
panies and outsiders need not differ in a significant manner. Be-
cause visible linkages between keiretsu members may be few, keiretsu
affiliates and nonaffiliates are often difficult to distinguish. In addi-
tion, keiretsu arrangements are frequently fluid ones. Companies are
not restricted to membership in a single keiretsu. Hitachi Corpora-
tion, which is a member of both the Dai-Ichi Kangyo group and the
Sanwa group, is only one example of this fluidity. 70 Keiretsu are also
often interlinked with other keiretsu which do not compete with them
because they are a different type of keiretsu.7' This situation renders
the identification of affiliation between individual firms and single
keiretsu imprecise because it is difficult to deconstruct the web of rela-
tionships comprising each keiretsu to determine to which of the two or
more integrated keiretsu the individual firm belongs. 72
Efforts to develop a keiretsu typology have been extensive. Cor-
68 Haley, Japanese Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 25, at 359.
69 Lawrence, supra note 26, at 313.
70 Hitachi itself is a central manufacturer within its own keiretsu, in which 688 firms are
involved. Inside the Charmed Circle, supra note 17, at 54. This massive heiretsu, and not
merely Hitachi Corporation, is actually the affiliate of both the Dai-Ichi Kangyo group and
the Sanwa group. Rapoport & Solo, supra note 56, at 76.
71 This sort of inter-keiretsu affiliation occurs between keiretsu organized horizontally
and keiretsu organized vertically.
72 Several striking examples of this interlinkage exist. Among these are the associa-
tion of the NEC keiretsu with the Sumitomo group, the integration of the Toyota group and
Toshiba group with the Mitsui group, and the affiliation of the Nissan keiretsu with the Fuyo
group. See Rapoport & Solo, supra note 56, at 81 (discussing the interlinkage in various
keiretsu).
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porate groups have been characterized according to their function, 3
the direction and nature of their interconnections,7 4 and their moti-
vation for integration. 75 To achieve a measure of simplicity without
sacrificing accuracy, the distinction of keiretsu on the basis of the na-
ture and direction of their interconnections is adopted in the analysis
contained below. This categorization distinguishes between keiretsu
organized horizontally and keiretsu organized vertically.
2. Horizontal Keiretsu
a. Introduction
Horizontal keiretsu unite companies acting in a wide variety of
industrial sectors that appear to have few synergies.76 Typically, the
industries in which these keiretsu have affiliates include banking, cars,
electronics, food and beverages, industrial equipment, insurance,
73 This characterization categorizes keiretsu by their functional elements, such as the
flow of capital, the consolidation of production, and the integration of distribution. See
Fujigane & Ennis, supra note 17, at 27. The distinction between the functional elements of
production and distribution appears to be an artificial one, as both production and distri-
bution are steps along the same vertical chain. For this reason, among others, this catego-
rization is not utilized here.
74 This "interconnections" categorization distinguishes between horizontal keiretsu
and vertical keiretsu. The former "functional elements" categorization includes keiretsu
uniting companies in disparate industries which, at first glance, appear to have few syner-
gies with one another. The second "interconnections" category includes keiretsu organized
in order to integrate the production and distribution functions necessary for the genera-
tion of revenue from a principal product produced by the company constituting the
"center of gravity" of each of these keiretsu. This second category, which the author em-
ploys in the article, escapes the artificiality of the distinction between production-con-
nected keiretsu and distribution-connected keiretsu outlined briefly in the above note. For a
more detailed discussion of this method of distinction, see Helou, supra note 17, at 103-04.
75 This categorization is applied differently for horizontal keiretsu and vertical keiretsu.
For horizontal keiretsu, a distinction is made between the former zaibatsu (pre-World War II
corporate groups) and non-zaibatsu keiretsu. For the four horizontal keiretsu based on the
former zaibatsu - Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui, and Fuyo (the reformed Yasuda group) -
the motivation for integration was the power of the family dominating the zaibatsu prior to
World War II and the gradual re-structuring of those ties after the dissolution of the
zaibatsu forced by the American Occupation following the War. IYORI & UESUGI, sUpra note
16, at 1-10. For the two non-zaibatsu horizontal keiretsu - the Dai-Ichi Kagyo Bank group
and the Sanwa Bank group - the motivation for integration appears to be the economic
leverage exercised by the bank at the center of these keiretsu. Inside the Charmed Circle, supra
note 17, at 54.
Kenichi Imai has developed a different typology for the vertical keiretsu. In this typol-
ogy, he identifies five types of vertical keiretsu: (1) keiretsu centered around a principal man-
ufacturer but with webs of cross-shareholdings; (2) eiretsu developed by a parent company
spinning off divisions into subsidiaries; (3) keiretsu established by a principal manufacturer
creating a pyramid of sub-contractors; (4) keiretsu which have not only spun off former
divisions but also have encouraged new affiliates and entered into new fields of business;
and (5) keiretsu related principally through the charisma of the parent company's owner.
Id. This analysis is not applied in this article both because of its complexity and because of
the questionable relevance of the motivation for integration to the legal treatment of
keiretsu.
76 HERBERT HOVENCAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw § 12.1 (Student
ed. 1985) (discussing competition and conglomerate mergers).
1993] JAPANESE CORPORATE STRUCTURE 369
and international trade.77 Consensus among analysts indicates there
are six such keiretsu in Japan, four of which are based on their pre-
World War II counterparts, the zaibatsu,78 while two are centered
around the large banks for which they are named.7 9
The zaibatsu were pre-World War II groups of companies con-
trolled by central holding companies, which were dissolved by the
American Occupation following the end of the War.80 The integra-
tion and power of the horizontal keiretsu are weak echoes of those of
the zaibatsu. However, although they no longer retain the same de-
gree of dominance in the Japanese economy, these corporate group-
ings are still responsible for a substantial portion of Japanese
economic activity. 8 '
Horizontal keiretsu, like conglomerate mergers, offer certain syn-
ergies which enable cost minimization to the integrated firms. These
77 The industries included in these groupings are more diverse than those few named
above. In addition to those named, horizontal keiretsu include companies in the following
industries, among others: cameras and optics; cement; chemicals; construction; fibers and
textiles; metals; mining and forestry; oil and coal; pulp and paper; real estate; rubber and
glass; and shipping and transportation. For greater detail, see Rapoport & Solo, supra note
56, at 76.
78 These companies were, in turn, controlled by the powerful families at the helm of
each zaibatsu. These organizations were alleged to have assumed the leading role in Ja-
pan's entry and participation in World War II. As a result, one of the primary acts of the
American Occupation in the aftermath of the War was to dissolve the zaibatsu and to design
a statute to prevent the re-emergence of these groupings. This statute, the Anti-Monopoly
Law, included provisions unique to Japanese antitrust law that are intended to prevent the
redevelopment of zaibatsu. These provisions included prohibitions on the formation or
operation of holding companies in Japan and restrictions on the extent of permissible
inter-corporate shareholding.
Although there were many more than four zaibatsu, the principal zaibatsu were the Mit-
subishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui, and Yasuda zaibatsu. While the AML has succeeded in prevent-
ing the reemergence of these zaibatsu, these four groups have reunited in much more
loosely integrated keiretsu. Three of the keiretsu carry the same names. The fourth, the
Fuyo group, is the reformed Yasuda group. For more detailed discussion of the zaibatsu,
see IVORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 4-11, 77-85; Restriction Spawns KeiretsU,JAPAN EcoN.J.,
Sept. 1, 1990, at 5.
79 Like the four zaibatsu-based keiretsu, these two bank-centered keiretsu, the Dai-Ichi
Kangyo Bank group and the Sanwa Bank group, developed during the 1960s, the period of
the most rapid growth of the Japanese economy. See Hiroshi Iyori, Antitrust and Industrial
Policy in Japan: Competition and Cooperation, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECON-
OMY 56, 65 (Gary R. Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986).
80 See IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 9-11 (providing an interesting discussion of
the role of the zaibatsu in World War II and their post-War treatment by the American
Occupation).
81 A recent survey by Toyo Keizai Inc. indicates that the member companies of these
six keiretsu, excluding their affiliated financial services companies, account for 4 % of Japan's
total work force, 14% of Japan's total assets, and 14.2% of Japan's total net income. In
recent years, the importance of these groups appears to have begun to wane. Four years
ago, they accounted for 14.2% of total assets and for 17.2% of total net income. This
drop is not due to a reduction in the absolute size of these groupings. For example, in the
same four year period, the total assets of the six groups actually rose by 80%. Instead, the
size of these groups relative to the remainder of the economy has changed. One sugges-
tion for this change is the growing importance of non-traditional industries and service
activities, in which the keiretsu have little impact. Fujigane, supra note 17, at 27-28.
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may include shared advertising costs, shared research and develop-
ment expenses, and collective benefit from the goodwill amassed by
any one of the integrated firms.82 In addition, synergy may result
from the great possibilities for intra-keiretsu reciprocal dealing; this
sort of transaction generally is a noncontractual arrangement
through which related firms consent to transact with one another
when business needs so dictate.8 3
b. Links Between Companies in Horizontal Keiretsu
The formal links between companies in a horizontal keiretsu are
few. A bank84 and sogo shosha (comprehensive trading company)85
are at the center of each group, but the affiliation between these cen-
tral companies and others within the keiretsu is loose. None of the
related companies are a division of other keiretsu firms and few are
subsidiaries of other companies within the group;86 often, no more
that ten percent of a firm's shares are owned by any one company. 87
Instead, the cohesion of the horizontal keiretsu is ensured through the
use of several links. These include intra-keiretsu financing, intercor-
porate shareholding, interlocking directorates, and close intercorpo-
rate operational relationships. 88 An additional link, unique to
horizontal keiretsu, is the regular meeting of societies of presidents of
major member firms.
82 HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, § 12.2.
83 Because the relationship is an ongoing one, these transactions benefit from the
consequent reduction in both information costs and transaction costs. Further, because
transactions between the firms may coincide in time, transportation costs can be mini-
mized. The transportation vehicle in which firm A sends goods to firm B need not return
empty, as it would in the absence of reciprocal dealing; instead, it may be used for the
shipment of goods purchased from firm B by firm A.
84 Particularly during the period of rapid economic growth during the 1950s and
1960s, the banks provided their corporate affiliates with otherwise-scarce capital. The
main banks continue to provide essential services to keiretsu affiliates. First of all, they
provide long-term debt financing to member firms that assures stability and enables long-
term planning. Secondly, in the event of insolvency, the banks either will provide an injec-
tion of finances or, in conjunction with other keiretsu firms, will engineer the takeover of the
failing firm by a more successful affiliate. See sources cited supra note 17.
85 Particularly during the period of rapid growth in 1950s and 1960s, the sogo shosha
played a critical role in corporate development, as they provided their affiliates with raw
materials otherwise unavailable in Japan. In addition, they marketed the output of affili-
ates abroad.
The sogo shosha continue these important functions today, as they market the varied
output, ranging from pencils to portable computers, of member firms around the world;
however, the characterization of sogo shosha as "trading companies" no longer serves as an
accurate description of these organizations. In the over-heated financial climate of the late
1980s, the sogo shosha, like many other Japanese firms, speculated in both the equity and
property markets. As a result, trade-related activity fell as a percentage of overall activity,
using the movement of trade receivables as a proxy for relative levels of trade activity.
Over the 1980s, trade receivables, an indication of trade financing, fell from 46% to 29%
of total sogo shosha assets. The Web Rips, EcONOMIST, Aug. 8, 1992, at 68.
86 Neff & Holstein, supra note 46, at 98.
87 Id.
88 See supra Part II.B.I-2.
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In the horizontal keiretsu, intra-keiretsu financing assumes both
debt and equity forms. Debt financing is provided in large part by
the main bank and sogo shosha central to each keiretsu; additional fi-
nancing is provided by large manufacturing companies associated
with the keiretsu. The bank provides long-term debt financing that, in
effect, renders the bank an equity investor.89 The sogo shosha and
manufacturing companies provide trade credit that is of a similar ef-
fect. As outlined above,90 equity financing, in the form of extensive
cross-shareholding, is provided by many firms within the keiretsu.
The impact of intra-keiretsu financing on interfirm relationships
is reinforced by three personnel practices. These comprise the inter-
corporate exchange of employees and executives, the integration of
firm directorates, and the periodic meetings of the presidents of ma-
jor keiretsu firms. The effect of intercorporate exchanges of employ-
ees, executives, and directors were also described above.9'
The impact of the unique presidential meetings is not easy to
discern92 because the meetings are not recorded and the decisions
that may be taken remain unknown to all but the participants in the
meetings.93 It is unclear whether these meetings serve as fora for the
coordination of policies and activities 94 or merely as settings for per-
89 The intimate relationship of each affiliate to the keiretsu bank is such that it more
closely resembles an equity or ownership relationship. Banks provide long-term financing,
where needed, to affiliates, in order to ensure the continued viability of corporate affiliates.
This provides a significant competitive advantage to Japanese firms, which, in many cases,
are virtually guaranteed to continue as going concerns. Western companies are unable,
therefore, to take advantage of the market weakness of Japanese firms in order to gain
access to the Japanese market.
90 See supra Part II.B.l.a.
91 See supra Part II.B.l.b.
92 The potential impact of the meetings on the economy is great, as each of the six
horizontal keiretsu assemble the heads of numerous large corporations in their monthly
meetings of each keiretsu's society. The chart below identifies each keiretsu's society and lists
the number of presidential participants in each monthly meeting.
Horizontal Name of Number of
Keiretsu Society Participants
Mitsui Nimokukai 24
Mitsubishi Kinyokai 30
Sumitomo Hakusuikai 20
Fuyo Fuyokai 29
Sanwa Sansuikai 44
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Sankinkai 47
Among the twenty-four companies meeting in the Nimokukai are such prominent firms as
Mitsui Taiyo Kobe Bank, Mitsui Trust & Banking, Mitsui Life Insurance, Taisho Marine &
Fire Insurance, Mitsui & Co. (sogo shosha), Mitsui Petrochemical Industries, Mitsui Engi-
neering & Shipbuilding, Toshiba Corporation, and Toyota Motor. Fujigane, supra note 17,
at 28-29.
93 The extent of coordination achieved at each of the horizontal keiretsu's monthly
meetings is a subject of debate because of the secrecy of the content of the meetings. Id.
94 Helou, supra note 17, at 105-06.
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sonal interaction. 9 5 Regardless of the content of the meetings, they
provide a significant tax benefit to participating corporations be-
cause sums expended on corporate entertainment are excluded from
taxable income. 96
Intercorporate operational relationships further the integration
of the horizontal keiretsu. Relational contracting involves frequent in-
terfirm reciprocal dealings and less frequent exclusive dealings; the
latter form of transaction is one in which a firm requires a related
firm to sell to it all of its output or to purchase from it all of its input
of a certain type. As a result of both sorts of preferred dealing, many
of the purchases of horizontal keiretsu firms are made within the
group.
Resource pooling also typifies the horizontal keiretsu. In addition
to the aspects of this pooling outlined earlier,9 7 intra-keiretsu joint
ventures are common. Typically, they are arranged by the sogo
shosha, which enjoy a leading role as a result of their comparative
advantages in both information technology and activity coordina-
tion;98 both of these elements are critical to the organization of suc-
cessful joint ventures. The reliance of the other keiretsu firms not
only on the sogo shosha, but also on the banks heightens the influence
these companies have over other keiretsu companies.
c. Effects on Market
Market foreclosure effects occur when a potential or actual par-
ticipant in a market is prevented from participating in the market by
the closure of the market resulting from competitive practices. The
foreclosure effects of all of the integrating elements of the keiretsu are
95 This is the assertion of Yohei Mimura, Chairman of Mitsubishi Corporation, who
represents the Kinyokai, the monthly Friday meeting of the presidents of companies affili-
ated with the Mitsubishi keiretsu. He described the course of a typical meeting:
We gather once a month, on the second Friday, at noon. We take fifteen
minutes to eat, mostly curry and rice or beef and rice in a bowl. The next
fifteen minutes are for talks about donations, various events planned and re-
ports from companies with the Mitsubishi name on them. Finally, we listen
to outside guest speakers for an hour and adjourn at 1:30. We are all busy,
so we all leave as soon as the meeting ends.
Fujigane, supra note 17, at 29. Further detail was added by Motoyoshi Shiraishi, the Chief
Manager of the Kinyokai, who stated that "The members never argue about [such impor-
tant matters as] joint projects. They don't talk about business while eating, either. It's like
relatives getting together for an informal talk." Id.
96 The importance of this exemption becomes clear when it is realized that Japanese
corporations have annual corporate entertainment expenditures of five trillion yen (ap-
proximately $35 billion).
97 See supra Part II.B.2.b.
98 Sophisticated information technology is necessary for the management of the com-
plexities inherent in the business of the sogo shosha. As part of these activities, the company
must coordinate a multiplicity of products and many international offices. As a result, the
complex decision-making skills and communications capabilities of the sogo shosha are the
most sophisticated among all keiretsu firms. See Helou, supra note 17, at 106-07 (discussing
the comparative strengths of the sogo shosha).
(VOL. 18
JAPANESE CORPORATE STRUCTURE
significant because they often erect insurmountable barriers to par-
ticipants in the sectors in which the keiretsu are active. Reciprocal and
exclusive dealings make Japanese companies reluctant to purchase
goods from new sources of supply, including imports.9 9 Similarly,
reciprocal and exclusive dealings restrict a keiretsu member from sell-
ing output to new companies trying to establish themselves in Japan.
In addition, fierce competition between different keiretsu and the mas-
sive financial and corporate clout available to the keiretsu may render
the entry of foreign competitors into the Japanese market prohibi-
tively expensive. However, the existence of these foreclosure effects
does not automatically render the practices of horizontal keiretsu an-
ticompetitive; this evaluation must be made in the context of Japa-
nese standards of antitrust law.' 00
3. Vertical Keiretsu
a. Introduction
Vertical keiretsu unite companies acting in several sectors that
comprise one vertical chain of activity directed at the generation of
revenues from a principal product. These keiretsu typically involve
companies engaged in the production of component products, the
assembly of principal products, and the distribution of keiretsu out-
put.' 0 ' They have gained particular prominence in the automotive
and electronics sectors, which currently employ over twenty-five per-
cent of the Japanese workforce.' 0 2 As a result of the prominence of
vertical keiretsu in certain sectors, eighty-five percent of small and me-
dium enterprises in certain sectors act as subcontractors to larger
firms.10 3 In some industries, the keiretsu not only have channelized
subcontractors, but also have adapted the pre-existing distribution
system to their needs.10 4
The distribution system, which consists of multiple, interlocked
layers of small businesses, is economically inefficient and results in
99 The results of a recent survey indicate that members of the horizontal keiretsu
sourced 29.6% of their consumer good supplies and 37.2% of their capital good supplies
from non-keiretsu firms. Fujigane, supra note 17, at 30. While this indicates there is scope
for non-keiretsu firm dealings with keiretsu members, 70.4% of consumer goods and 62.7%
of capital goods are still supplied within keiretsu, leaving only a small portion of keiretsu
needs to be satisfied by firms external to the keiretsu system. Id.
100 See infra Part IV.
101 See infra Part IV.
102 Japanese Corporate Strategy: New, Improved, EcONOMIST, March 21, 1992, at 72, 73.
103 Richard Katz, Author Skeptical of MITI's Plan to Hike Imports, JAPAN ECON. J., Feb. 17,
1990, at Al. These arrangements are particularly prevalent in industries in which Japa-
nese economies have captured significant international market share. In the transport in-
dustry, 88% of small and medium enterprises (SME) are sub-contractors, while in the
electrical machinery industry and the automobile industries, 85% of SME are sub-contrac-
tors. Id.; Helou, supra note 17, at 116 n.57 (discussing extent of the vertical keiretsu).
104 The industries in which keiretsu distribution networks are prevalent include elec-
tronics, cameras, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals. Lawrence, supra note 26, at 325.
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extremely high retail prices. 10 5 However, it should not be evaluated
on a pure economic efficiency standard. Its current form is the prod-
uct of several factors, including social welfare, financial require-
ments, and cultural preference.
The distribution system fulfills social welfare objectives because
it effectively supplants the need in Japan for more extensive unem-
ployment 10 6 and public pension systems; 10 7 the distribution system
provides employment for thousands of workers who might otherwise
require public assistance. It also satisfies the financial needs of distri-
bution firms since it eliminates the need for more extensive direct
debt financing; each layer in the system often provides generous
credit terms to those below it. lo0 In addition, the distribution system
conforms with a Japanese cultural preference for local distributor-
ships which permit the traditional purchase of fresh goods daily from
a neighborhood institution. Despite these influences, the extent of
keiretsu channelization of distribution systems is beginning to decline
as the profitability of these proprietary distribution systems has
fallen. '0 9
Vertical keiretsu still suit the interests of both the central manu-
facturing firm and the smaller sub-contractor or distributor firms.
The central manufacturing concern is guaranteed a quantity and
quality of inputs at reasonable cost by the subcontractors; it is simi-
larly guaranteed both a reasonable revenue and an acceptable quality
of promotional and distributional service from the distribution out-
lets."l0 The smaller subcontractor firms receive extensive manage-
rial, technological, and financial support from the larger firm."I '
105 Shapiro & Hamilton, supra note 8, at 14. As a result, Japan has double the number
of retail stores per capita found in other industrialized economies. Each of these busi-
nesses, in acting as a middleman, adds a mark-up to the value of the goods. The result is
the creation of great inefficiency and extremely high retail prices, perhaps 300% greater
than the original producer price. Punke, supra note 1, at 61.
106 Michael R. Czinkota, Distribution in Japan: Problems and Changes, 20 COLUM.J. WORLD
Bus. 65, 66 (Fall 1985). The large number of small channel operators provides significant
amounts of employment and functions as a social welfare net. The distribution system
serves to absorb excess labor during past economic downturns and thereby eliminates the
need for a more extensive unemployment insurance and welfare framework. Id.
107 Id. In a manner similar to the replacement by the distribution system of the need
for a more extensive unemployment insurance system, the purchase of small retail opera-
tions by retired Japanese employees replaces the need for a more substantial public pen-
sion system. These purchases are facilitated by the lump-sum pension distributed to
retirees by large, corporate employers upon retirement. Id.
108 The distribution system acts as a system of financing, in which large wholesalers
grant longer payment terms to small retailers, to the ultimate profit of the large compa-
nies. Shapiro & Hamilton, supra note 8, at 14 (citing McKINSEY & Co., JAPAN BUSINESS:
OBSTACLES & OPPORTUNITIES 17 (1983)).
109 This process is the outcome of the emergence of discount stores able to undercut
the prices of traditional distributorships and, thereby, attract their customers. See sources
cited infra notes 129, 133.
110 Fujigane & Ennis, supra note 17, at 27.
111 Id.
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Small distribution outlets benefit from the provision of trade credit
by keiretsu wholesalers. The large firm guaranties business stability
and a reasonable long-term profit to both sorts of smaller
affiliates. 112
The efficiencies available through vertical keiretsu are more obvi-
ous than those attainable through horizontal keiretsu. Both transac-
tion costs and information costs are minimized by the entry into
long-term relationships with related subcontractors and distribu-
tors."13 Long-term exclusive relationships foster a commitment by
each firm to the other and a willingness to cooperate and not to liti-
gate in the event of a change of circumstance.
b. Links Between Companies in Vertical Keiretsu
The integrative mechanisms used to unite the members of a ver-
tical keiretsu include intra-keiretsu financing, intercorporate sharehold-
ing, interlocking directorates, and close intercorporate operational
relationships." 14 These links differ from those binding the horizon-
tal keiretsu largely because of the dominant position enjoyed by the
principal manufacturers in vertical keiretsu. Horizontal keiretsu do not
have single firms enjoying the same relative degree of economic
power with respect to other firms in the keiretsu.
Intra-keiretsu financing is provided, in large part, by principal
manufacturers and keiretsu wholesalers. Banks and sogo shosha are not
directly related to the vertical keiretsu. Corporate shareholding is not
reciprocal; although principal companies hold shares in their depen-
dent affiliates, the affiliates typically hold no shares in the central
manufacturing companies.' 15
While directorates are related, the relationship is also unidirec-
tional. The central company has great influence over the appointees
to the dependent firms' directorates;" 16 the converse is not true.
This result is also the one-sided by-product of the unequal relation-
ship between the powerful central company and its affiliated depen-
dent firms.
112 Hasegawa, supra note 29, at 59.
113 HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, § 7.2.
114 See supra Part II.B.1-2.
115 The Toyota vertical Aeiretsu provides an illustration of this point. Toyota Motor
Corporation, the principal manufacturer, holds a 19% equity stake in Koito Manufacturing
Company, a Toyota sub-contractor, and a 23.6% equity stake in Nippondenso Company,
which is one of Toyota's three primary sub-contractors. Neither holds a stake in Toyota
Motor Company, though Nippondenso Company holds a 5% stake in Toyota Automatic
Loom Works Ltd., which created the car company in the 1940s. Hasegawa, supra note 29,
at 59.
116 Evidence of this influence is provided by the attempted hostile takeover by U.S.
corporate raider T. Boone Pickens of Toyota affiliate Koito Manufacturing Company.
Although Pickens held more equity than Toyota (26.4% to 19%), Toyota was able to de-
termine the composition of the board and deny Pickens' attempt at representation on
Koito's directorate. Id.
19931
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Intercorporate operational integration is much greater in a ver-
tical keiretsu than it is in a horizontal keiretsu. Because the activities of
all companies along the vertical chain are oriented toward the pro-
duction of revenue from related activities, the operations of the firms
must be bound by much tighter operational links. These links join
not only the principal manufacturer with its subcontractors, but also
the principal manufacturer with its distributors. Both types of de-
pendent firms are bound to the central firm through the use of verti-
cal restraints. 117 In addition, the integration of subcontractor
operations with those of central firms is achieved through both joint
product development and design and integrated production sched-
ules. The integration of distribution firm operations with those of
principal manufacturers is realized through cooperative promotional
programs.
The close relationship between principal manufacturers and
subcontractors may be cemented through exclusive dealing arrange-
ments, either explicit or implicit. Whether or not this form of re-
straint is included in the relations of particular keiretsu companies, the
activities of subcontractors are tightly integrated with those of the
primary firm. As a result of the close relationship between subcon-
tractors and the principal manufacturer, the risks and costs associ-
ated with the development of new products necessary for the
primary manufacturing output will be shared by the related firms in
the quest for the success of their joint product."" Additionally, the
production of high quality goods for the primary manufacturer is
fostered by the mutual commitment of the parties. Total quality
management," t9 the basis for Japanese manufacturing, relies on this
relationship for its success. 120
The storage costs of the manufacturer are reduced by the inte-
gration of the subcontractor into the manufacturer's activities. The
subcontractor, certain of its demand and associated revenue, may
produce only when necessary for the primary manufacturer. The
117 J. Amanda Covey, Vertical Restraints under Japanese Law: The Antimonopoly Law Study
Group Report, 14 L. JAPAN 49 (1981); Haley, Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, supra note 25, at
335 (discussing important role of vertical trade restraints in cohesion of keiretsu).
118 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, § 8.12 (discussing the advantages of exclusive deal-
ings relationships).
119 Through this system, the manufacturer of each product assigns the responsibility
for quality control to each member of the factory staff, in particular to the factory workers.
This fosters worker commitment to the output and its quality and prevents the massive
waste generated by earlier Western quality control systems that relied on periodic inspec-
tions by quality control inspectors of finished products. This has improved the cost mini-
mization efforts ofJapanese manufacturing, as it eliminates the payroll expense of quality
control inspectors and reduces the occurrence of defects.
120 This is one reason cited for the difficulty Japanese manufacturers would have with
the integration of low-cost foreign inputs into their products. Despite their low cost, these
goods are often rendered unattractive by the distance that would separate the Japanese
manufacturer and its foreign suppliers. This would impede the quality management and
just-in-time inventory systems on which the Japanese manufacturing system is based.
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kanban (just-in-time) inventory system is the result of this tight inte-
gration. 121 However, the success of the kanban inventory system may
be difficult to maintain. As Japanese transportation infrastructure
proves increasingly inadequate to handle growing traffic congestion,
the just-in-time deliveries on which much of Japanese industry de-
pends will become difficult to accomplish.
In order to encourage keiretsu distribution outlets to display only
keiretsu goods and to maintain recommended retail prices, several
forms of vertical restraints on distribution outlets are used. These
may include resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing arrange-
ments, rebates of various sorts, advertising subsidies, and refusals to
deal.' 22 These restraints are described below.123
The integration of distribution outlets with the manufacturing
concern efficiently focuses the outlets' resources on the promotion,
distribution, and service of a single product line. 124 This ensures
both high quality distribution and servicing. In addition, it prevents
free-riding by other products on the promotional efforts of the man-
ufacturer; the phenomenon of free-riding develops when one prod-
uct is promoted and a second product benefits from this promotion
yet does not share in the promotional expense. 125
The efficiencies achieved through the vertical keiretsu maximize
the profits that may be earned by the joint efforts of the primary
manufacturer and its vertically integrated affiliates. The extra profits
may be allocated according to any one of several decision rules.' 26
In reality, the decision rule determining the allocation of profits is
121 The just-in-time inventory system is another one of the elements ofJapanese man-
ufacturing that facilitates the cost minimization that allows it to succeed internationally.
Storage costs are a weighty expense; this is particularly true in Japan, where the scarcity of
space mandates a premium. These costs are effectively eliminated through the kanban sys-
tem, in which the components of the principal products are delivered to the central manu-
facturer only as they are required. The cost minimization that results is enabled by the
tightly integrated operating relationship of the sub-contractors and principal manufac-
turer. Hasegawa, supra note 29, at 59.
122 There are a multiplicity of rebates used by keiretsu. Among them are sales share
rebates (senyu ritsu), in which the rebate rate corresponds to the ratio of keiretsu sales to
total sales, progressive rebates (ruishin), in which the rebate rate corresponds to increased
sales, and loyalty rebates (chusei), in which rebate rates increase in accordance with the
degree of conformity to the keiretsu's marketing policy. Covey, supra note 117, at 71-72
(discussing the role of rebates in Japanese distribution);Japan to Honor Commitment to Retail
Reform, Agrees to Allow Credit Cards, MITI Reports, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 966 (1990).
123 See infra Part III.C.2.a-d.
124 Covey, supra note 117, at 54.
125 HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, § 8.12.
126 These rules include arbitrary division, equal division, and power-based division.
According to the first rule, the extra profitability garnered from a more profitable arrange-
ment might be allocated randomly among the participating parties. According to the sec-
ond rule, the extra profitability might be evenly divided by the participating parties.
According to the third rule, the extra profitability would be allocated in accordance with
the relative power of the participating parties; in the case of the vertical keiretsu, in which
the principal manufacturer is the most powerful party, the extra profits would accrue en-
tirely to this party.
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the relative power of the parties.) 27 Because the central manufac-
turer is the most powerful unit within the vertical heiretsu, it garners
the extra profits and leaves its affiliates only slim profits deemed rea-
sonable over the long term;12 8 this is often termed as "squeezing the
affiliates" for maximum profits. Consequently, affiliates may earn lit-
tle or no profit in the short term, but in the long term, the ongoing
patronage of the principal manufacturer ensures stable returns to
the affiliates.
Distribution outlets are not completely prevented from increas-
ing the profits they earn by altering the price and quantity of prod-
ucts sold, so long as they have not entered into exclusive dealing
arrangements that have binding vertical restraints. This situation
has allowed discount retailers to emerge into the market and to chal-
lenge traditional keiretsu distribution networks.' 2 9 The intense com-
petition from discount stores,' 30 the heavy expense of supporting
keiretsu distribution outlets, 131 and the high storage costs of main-
taining inventory levels at individual outlets 32 have reduced the rel-
ative efficiency of proprietary distribution networks. 133 This has
resulted in the downsizing of these networks. It has also led to re-
quests by principal manufacturers that discount retailers raise prices
in order to allow the principal manufacturers to recapture their for-
mer, high profit margins.13 4
127 See Fujigane & Ennis, supra note 17, at 27 (discussing the uneven distribution of
profits); Hasegawa, supra note 29, at 58.
128 The long-term nature of the slight profits enables the continuation of these firms.
Fujigane & Ennis, supra note 17, at 27.
129 Japanese retailing is currently undergoing a great deal of change as larger stores
and different pricing policies develop. For a discussion of these changes and those likely
to evolve in the future, see Eijiro Hara et al., Distribution Keiretsu: Electronics Stores Rebel,
TOKYO Bus. TODAY, Sept. 1990, at 35; George Palmer, WESTERN FIRMSJOSTLE FOR A SHARE
IN JAPAN'S RETAIL REVOLUTION, 3 MULTINATIONAL Bus. 9 (1990); Carla Rapoport, Ready,
Set, Sell - Japan is Buying, FORTUNE, Sept. 11, 1989, at 159.
13o As discount stores increase in prevalence, Japanese consumers need no longer rely
on keiretsu distributorships for all their needs in certain sectors. This competition forces
these distributorships either to reduce their prices or, if these prices cannot be lowered
because of systemic inefficiency, to exit the market.
131 A wide variety of expenses are incurred in the support of keiretsu distributorships,
including shared promotional expenses and inventory maintenance costs. Czinkota, supra
note 106, at 66-67.
132 This need is an indication of the inefficiency of proprietary distribution systems.
Each distributorship must maintain a full inventory, with the associated storage costs, of a
single line of products, as this constitutes most of what distribution outlets sell. Id.
133 While there is a growing trend toward discount retailing, its impact onjapan is not
yet complete. In December 1991, Toys 'R' Us, an American discount toy retailer, opened
its first Japanese store in the Ibaraki Prefecture, about forty miles north of Tokyo. Guess
Who's Selling Barbies in Japan Now?, Bus. WK., Dec. 9, 1991, at 60. Toys 'R' Us plans to open
additional stores in the near future, and other American retailers are expected to follow
this lead. Id. This presages a restructuring of Japanese retailing that will further reduce
the role of keiretsu in the distribution of goods.
134 Hara, supra note 129, at 36.
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c. Effects on the Market
All producers seeking to sell their products in Japan are com-
pelled to deal with the vertical keiretsu and their market foreclosure
effects. An outsider can overcome vertical restraints utilized by
keiretsu to cement proprietary subcontracting and distribution net-
works only with a significant expenditure on the establishment of
new proprietary networks. '3 5 Self-dealing within vertical keiretsu may
deny entry to foreign products. 136 Foreign producers are con-
fronted with additional barriers arising from the unwillingness or in-
ability of traditional non-keiretsu distribution outlets to stock foreign
products. 37 With the emergence of nonproprietary discount out-
lets, however, this unwillingness is changing. Any anticompetitive
aspects of this structure must be assessed in the context of Japanese
antitrust law. 138
III. Competition Law
A. Introduction
As introduced earlier,139 the alleviation of the alleged anticom-
petitive practices inherent in Japanese industry requires three in-
dependent findings. These determinations comprise the foreclosure
of the Japanese market, the existence of anticompetitive behaviour
causing this foreclosure, and the effective applicability of Japanese
competition law to the questionable behaviour. The first two matters
have been outlined above.140 The third and most determinative mat-
ter must still be examined. The efforts invested in the continuing
Structural Impediments Initiative negotiations may come to their in-
135 This need not entirely prevent new entry into proprietary distribution in Japan.
However, the incredible expense and associated risk dissuade many potential entrants.
Shapiro & Hamilton, supra note 8, at 16. One exception was BMW, which established
proprietary dealerships following unsatisfactory results from previous dealer arrange-
ments. Stories such as this are rare.
Companies seeking to enter Japanese distribution must do so with a great deal of
sensitivity to local demand. In addition to ensuring that the product is suited to the local
market, the packaging, presentation, and price must all communicate the social status of
the item in accordance with local market expectations. Id. American car manufacturers
notoriously failed to suit the product to the Japanese market when they attempted to sell
cars with steering wheels on the wrong side to the Japanese mass market.
136 HOVENWKAMP, supra note 76, § 7.2.
137 Reluctance by these distribution outlets to carry foreign products results from the
small size of non-keiretsu outlets and the lack of any central distribution network which
might facilitate distribution of imported goods to small outlets. In addition, both the pre-
mium pricing of imports and the apparent cultural predisposition ofJapanese distributors
to domestic products increase this reluctance. Foreign products are deemed by some to
be inappropriate for the unique characteristics of the Japanese consumer. Punke, supra
note 1, at 59-61.
138 See infra Part IV.
139 See supra Part I.
140 See supra Part II.
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tended fruition only if Japanese competition law is capable of con-
trolling the activities at issue.
As noted above,14 1 the central role played by the zaibatsu in the
militarization of Japan prior to, and during, World War II led the
American Occupation authorities to dissolve these groups and to im-
pose a rigid antitrust statute.142 This action was intended to pre-
empt a recurrence of both the concentration of economic power and
the distortion that resulted from anticompetitive activities.1 43 The
legislation is entitled the Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Mo-
nopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, but as noted earlier is com-
141 See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
142 Directive 244 of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), entitled
"Dissolution of Holding Companies" set out the following steps for the elimination of
zaibatsu power: the dissolution of the zaibatsu and other enterprise groupings; abolition of
measures promoting private monopolization; and establishment of a free competitive sys-
tem. Dissolution of Holding Companies, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers' Instruction
Number 244 to the Japanese Government (SCAPIN No. 244), Nov. 6, 1945, in SUPREME COM-
MANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SCAPINS: SUPREME COM-
MANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS' INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT FROM
SEPTEMBER 4, 1945 TO MARCH 8, 1952, 39-40 (1952) [hereinafter SCAP INSTRUCTIONS].
The elimination ofzaibatsu power was realized in several stages. In 1945, a series of
SCAP directives froze the assets of eighteen zaibatsu. Sale or Transfer of Securities of Certain
Business Firms, SCAPIN No. 215, Oct. 31, 1945, in SCAP INSTRUCTIONS, supra at 37-38; Estab-
lishment of a Schedule of Restricted Concerns, SCAPIN No. 403, Nov. 9, 1945, in SCAP INSTRUC-
TIONS, supra at 59; Regulation Affecting Restricted Concerns, SCAPIN No. 408, Dec. 8, 1945, in
SCAP INSTRUCTIONS, supra at 60-61. The issuance of various Imperial Ordinances fur-
thered the dissolution of the zaibatsu. See Imperial Ordinance No. 233 of 1946 (Holding
Company Liquidation Commission Ordinance) (ordering holding companies to transfer
the securities they held to the Holding Company Liquidation Commission and thereafter
to dissolve); Imperial Ordinance No. 567 of 1946 (eliminating combinations through
shareholding, personal relationships with zaibatsu, or contractual relationships with
zaibatsu); Imperial Ordinance No. 592 of 1946 (ordering persons from fourteen of the
zaibatsu families to transfer securities to the Holding Company Liquidation Commission).
In 1947, the Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power Act, No. 207
(1947), was enacted. This Act empowered the Holding Company Liquidation Commission
to identify and eliminate "excessive concentration of economic power." See also Anti-Mo-
nopoly Law, supra note 16. For a further discussion of the steps taken to eliminate zaibatsu
power, see IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 6-20.
143 Mitsuo Matsushita, The Legal Framework of Japanese Industrial Policy, 1987 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 541, 543 (1987); IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 6-9. The Directive of the President
of the United States to General MacArthur, September 6, 1945, articulates the United
States' policy towards the zaibatsu:
Those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership shall be fa-
vored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the
Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic
activity in support of military ends.
To this end, it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:
(a) to prohibit the retention in or selection for places of im-
portance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct
future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends;
and
(b) to favor a program for the dissolution of the large indus-
trial and banking combinations which have exercised control of
a great part of Japan's trade and industry.
Directive of the President of the United States to General MacArthur, Sept. 6, 1945, re-
printed in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 7.
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monly referred to as the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML).1 44 The Japan
Fair Trade Commission (FTC) was established by the AML as an in-
dependent agency empowered to monitor and enforce the AML.
l4 5
Although the introduction of antitrust law into the country was ini-
tially perceived in Japan as a penalty for the loss of the war, almost
all Japanese economic actors have grown to accept and appreciate
the law. 146
All competition law is motivated by the attempt to achieve eco-
nomic efficiency that will benefit society. 147 Underlying the law,
though, is a fundamental tension between two conflicting objectives,
economic decentralization and economic synergy. Each of these
objectives is advanced as the optimum course by which to attain eco-
nomic efficiency.
In theory, economic decentralization fosters innovation and, ul-
timately, efficiency through the struggle for innovation, competitive-
ness, and survival among numerous small economic units. This
theory requires discouraging collaboration and dismantling all
emerging concentrations of economic power into multiple compo-
nent parts. Each of these small economic units will enter the strug-
gle for survival and success. Economic synergy, however, is
attainable through the joint efforts of numerous firms, whether they
are bound by ownership or contract. This latter goal mandates the
support of agglomeration of economic power and the advancement
of economic concentration. The role of antitrust law is to locate the
optimal balance between the two objectives, economic decentraliza-
tion and economic synergy, in order to allow the economy to attain
maximum efficiency.
The public policy objectives set out in the AML manifest these
general principles of competition law in Japan. The primary policy
objectives to be facilitated are noted in the beginning of the AML.148
144 AML, supra note 16, translated in IYORI & UESUcI, supra note 16.
145 IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 119-21.
146 Article 22 of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of occupation, may
be understood as a constitutional basis for competition policy in Japan. KENPO [CoNsTITU-
TION] art. XXII (Japan). The decision of the Consultative Group Coordinating Committee
(COCOM) in Nihon Kogyo Tenrankai v. Japan, 20 Gyosai Reisyu 842 (1969), established
the freedom of business activity to be one facet of the constitutionally-guaranteed freedom
of occupation. Free business activity is premised on the freedom of competition in the
marketplace and therefore requires an effective antitrust statute in order to ensure this
freedom.
147 For interesting insights into competition law, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 76; PHIL-
LIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1980); THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
COMPETITION POLICY (Frank Mathewson et al. eds., 1990).
148 Section 1 of Chapter I of the AML states:
This Act, by prohibiting private monopolization, unreasonable restraint of
trade and unfair business practices, by preventing the excessive concentra-
tion of economic power and by eliminating unreasonable restraint of produc-
tion, sale, price, technology, an$ the like, and all other undue restriction of
business activities through combinations, agreements, and otherwise, aims to
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They include the achievement of free and fair competition, the stim-
ulation of initiative among entrepreneurs, and the motivation of
business activities by enterprises. 149 These outcomes, in turn, are
intended to advance the democratic development 150 of the national
economy and to assure the consumer welfare.
The AML has several substantive sections. These sections pro-
hibit private monopolization and unreasonable restraint of competi-
tion among competitor companies,' 5 ' excessive stockholdings and
interlocking directorates, 152 and unfair business practices.153 Addi-
tional sections pertain to exemptions from the substantive coverage
of the AML,154 remedies for violations,155 and the establishment of
the FTC. 156 Of these sections, the ones most relevant to the alleged
anticompetitive practices of the keiretsu are those dealing with share-
holding and directorate offenses and with unfair business practices.
Each of the provisions relate to the ties binding keiretsu companies
together.
B. Shareholding and Directorate Offenses
Antitrust law must prevent the undue concentration of eco-
nomic power through the unacceptable consolidation of corporate
ownership and management. Consolidation to this degree may be
achieved most directly through the ownership of a firm. However, it
may also be effectively realized through the integration of corporate
directorates. Provisions of the AML address both of these poten-
tially anticompetitive situations. The restrictions on shareholding
and limitations on interlocking directorates are intended to preempt
the excessive centralization of economic power which characterized
promote free and fair competition, to stimulate the initiative of entrepre-
neurs, to encourage business activities of enterprises, to heighten the level of
employment and people's real income, and thereby to promote the demo-
cratic and wholesome development of the national economy as well as to
assure the interests of consumers in general.
AML, supra note 16, ch. I, § 1, translated in JYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 214.
149 Id.
150 The advancement of democratic economic development is an unusual objective
that appears to be an amalgam of the political objective of democracy with the economic
objective of development. What may be intended is the maximum decentralization of eco-
nomic power to individual economic actors in order to give them economic empowerment
that would encourage individual involvement in the democratic and political life of the
country. If this understanding is the correct one, it would seem to preclude the emergence
of firms manifesting concentrations of economic power. This might conflict with the
AML's primary objective of "encourag[ing] business activities of enterprises." Id.
151 Id. ch. II, §§ 3-7, translated in IYoRI & UESUGi, supra note 16, at 217-19.
152 Id. ch. IV, §§ 9-18, translated in IYoRI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 222-31.
153 Id. ch. V, §§ 19-20, translated in IYORI & UESUG1, supra note 16, at 231.
154 Id. ch. VI, §§ 21-24, translated in IoRI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 232-37.
155 Id. ch. VII, §§ 25-26, translated in IYoRI & UESUG1, supra note 16, at 237; id. ch. IX,
§§ 77-87, translated in IYoRI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 256-58; id. ch. X, §§ 89-100, trans-
lated in IYORI & UESUG1, supra note 16, at 259-64.
156 Id. ch. VIII, §§ 27-76, translated in IYoRI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 237-56.
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Japan at an earlier point in its history. 157
1. Shareholding Offenses
Several restrictions on shareholding, all of which are the out-
growths of the distinct corporate history of Japan,158 are included in
the AML. These rules are in addition to the restrictions imposed on
mergers' 59 and asset sales' 60 that are common to most countries in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).' 6 t The unusualJapanese provisions prohibit the establish-
ment of holding companies, restrict the ownership of stock that
might substantially reduce competition in any field of trade, and limit
the ownership of excessive blocs of shares. 162
The first form of restriction imposes a prohibition against hold-
ing companies in Japan. This is an absolute ban that allows no con-
157 See supra Part II.C.2.a.
158 The economic power of the zaibatsu motivated the original restriction on shares
that might be held by individuals or corporations. The 1977 amendment of the AML ad-
ded a further limitation on the cross-ownership of shares, as the result of the accumulation
by large companies, particularly by sogo shosha, of large blocs of shares. See AML, supra
note 16, ch. IV, § 9-2, translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 222; IYORI & UESUGI,
supra note 16, at 80.
159 Section 15 of Chapter IV of the AML outlines the provisions governing the anti-
trust elements of mergers in Japan:
(1) No company in Japan shall effect a merger or consolidation in either of
the following cases:
i) Where the effect of a merger may be substantially to re-
strain competition in any particular field of trade;
ii) Where unfair business practices have been employed in the
course of the merger or consolidation.
AML, supra note 16, ch. IV, § 15, translated in IYoRI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 228.
160 Section 16 of Chapter IV of the AML restricts the sale of assets where such a sale
would either substantially reduce competition or promote unfair business practices:
The provisions of the preceding section shall apply mutatis mutandis to an act
of a company coming under any one of the following cases:
(i) Acquiring the whole or a substantial part of the business
in Japan of another company;
(ii) Acquiring the whole or a substantial part of the fixed as-
sets used for the business in Japan of another company;
(iii) Taking on lease of the whole or a substantial part of the
business in Japan of another company;
(iv) Undertaking the management of the whole or a substan-
tial part of the business in Japan of another company;
(v) Entering into a contract which provides for a joint profit
and loss account for business in Japan with another company.
Id. ch. IV, § 16, translated in IYORI & UESUG1, supra note 16, at 229.
161 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is a group of in-
dustrialized nations that promotes economic growth among its members. Convention on
the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development [hereinafter the Convention],
opened for signature Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1729, T.I.A.S. No. 4891 (entered into force
Jan. 1, 1961). Signatories to the Convention include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and
the United States.
162 See infra notes 163-170 and accompanying text.
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sideration of mitigating factors.' 63 The severity of the restriction is a
consequence of the previous extreme control of the zaibatsu through
central holding companies. In determining the existence of a viola-
tion, consideration need only be given to the existence of a company
whose primary purpose is the control of the business of another
company through the possession of an equity stake. Strict liability
ensues.
The second form of restriction imposes a qualitative constraint
on shareholding. This constraint prohibits both the acquisition and
the possession of shares when these actions would substantially re-
duce competition.164 It is effective regardless of the existence or ab-
sence of concerted activity between actors. The only relevant
elements of the offense are the acquisition or ownership of equity
and the substantial reduction in competition that may result. There
is no single test to determine a substantial reduction in competition;
the unique market effects of each shareholding must be assessed
independently.' 6 5
The third form of restriction imposes a quantitative constraint
on shareholding. This constraint comprises two provisions which
separately impose limits on the amount of equity that may be owned
by nonfinancial and financial companies, respectively. The former
provision limits intercorporate shareholding166 by large nonfinancial
companies' 67 to a maximum of an acquiror's paid-up capital or net
163 Section 9 of Chapter IV of the AML states:
(1) No holding company shall be formed.
(2) Any company (including a foreign company . . .) shall not operate as a
holding company in Japan.
(3) The term "holding company" as used in the preceding two subsections
means a company Whose principal business is to control the business activi-
ties of a company or companies in Japan by means of holding of stock (in-
cluding shares of partnership...).
AML, supra note 16, ch. IV, § 9, translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 222.
164 Section 10 of the AML restricts the acquisition of shares:
(1) No company shall acquire or hold stock of a company or companies in
Japan where the effect of such acquisition or holding of stock may be sub-
stantially to restrain competition in any particular field of trade, or shall ac-
quire or hold stock of such company through unfair business practices.
Id. ch. IV, § 10(1), translated in IYoRI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 226.
165 The ruling In re Nippon Musical Instrument Co., 8 Kosei torihiki iinkai shinketsushu
[hereinafter Shinketsushu] 51 (FTC, Jan. 30, 1957), illustrates the nature of the evaluation
of effects on the relevant market. In that case, Nippon Musical Instrument Company
owned 24.5% of the outstanding shares in its rival Kawai Musical Instrument Company.
Each of the companies held substantial shares of the markets for several sorts of musical
instruments. The shareholding was in substantial reduction of competition. However,
Nippon Musical Instrument Company was charged under Section 17 of the AML rather
than Section 10 as the result of the evasive measures it employed in order to gain owner-
ship of the contested shares. See IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 81-82 (discussing the
Nippon case).
166 Id. at 80.
167 Section 9 of the AML affects all companies with capital in excess often billion yen
or with net assets in excess of thirty billion yen. AML, supra note 16, ch. IV, § 9(2), trans-
lated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 222-26.
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assets. 168 The latter provision restricts intercorporate shareholding
by a financial company to five to ten percent of the outstanding
shares of the target company.' 6 9 Both of these provisions provide
exemptions from their coverage in certain exceptional situations.' 70
The test for the existence of violations of these provisions is purely a
quantitative one; no consideration of the effects on competition is
necessary.
2. Directorate Offense
Without a prohibition against interlocking directorates, firms
might be able to gain anticompetitive concentrations of economic
power similar to those deriving from ownership if there were no re-
strictions on shareholding. This consolidation of company opera-
tions could be effected through the interchange of directors. To
prevent this, the AML prohibits an officer or an employee of one
company from assuming a position as an officer of a second company
when that might engender a substantial reduction in competition.' 7'
168 Section 9-2, as amended in 1977, limits the maximum inter-corporate stockholding
by a giant company to the equivalent of the larger of the paid-up capital or the net assets of
the acquiror company, unless one of the exceptional situations exempted from its cover-
age exists. The general provisions of the section state:
(1) Any stock company whose business is other than financial (this term
refers to those engaged in banking, mutual banking, trust, insurance, mutual
financing and securities businesses; the same meaning shall apply hereinaf-
ter) and whose capital is larger than ten billion yen or whose net assets (this
term refers to the sum of an account arrived at by deducting the total liabili-
ties from the total assets listed in the latest balance sheet and the amount by
which the net assets have increased as the result of an issuance of new stock
in accordance with the provisions of Article 280-2 of the Commercial Code
[Law No. 48 of 1899], or as a result of a merger or the conversion of corpo-
rate bonds, if any; hereinafter the same meaning shall apply in this section)
are larger than thirty billion yen shall not be allowed to acquire or hold stock
of companies in Japan in excess of its capital or its net assets, whichever is
larger (hereinafter referred to as the "base amount"), if by so doing value of
such stock (if different value of such stock is listed separately in the latest
balance sheet, said value can be used); the same meaning shall apply herein-
after) which it has acquired or holds exceeds the base amount: Provided,
that the foregoing shall not apply to the acquisition or holding of such stock
in [the exceptional circumstances outlined in the remainder of the
provision]....
Id. ch. IV, § 9-2(1), translated in IYoRI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 222-25.
169 This limit is 5% for most financial service companies and 10% for insurance com-
panies. Section 11 of the AML states:
(1) No company engaged in financial business shall acquire or hold stock of
another company in Japan if by doing so it holds in excess of five percent (ten
percent in the case of insurance company) of the total outstanding stock:
Provided, that the foregoing shall not apply to such cases for which prior
approval of the Fair Trade Commission is obtained in accordance with the
Rules of the Fair Trade Commission ....
Id. ch. IV, § 11, translated in IvoRI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 227. See also Daiwa Bank, 10
SHINKETSUSHU 36 (FTC, June 26, 1961) (decision in which Daiwa Bank found liable under
Section 11); IYORI & UESUG1, supra note 16, at 83-84 (discussing the Daiwa Bank case).
170 See supra notes 168-69.
171 Section 13 of the AML states:
(1) Neither an officer nor an employee (meaning in this section a person
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A quantitative substantiality standard is used in order to assess
the anticompetitiveness of interlocking directorates. A violation of
the AML occurs when the interlocking directorate fosters a substan-
tial reduction of competition in any field of trade; the substantiality
of the reduction in competition is evaluated on a quantitative basis
by looking at the market share held by the alleged violator.' 72 The
FTC has determined that such a reduction may only exist when the
two companies whose directorates are interconnected engage in the
same economic activity. 173
C. Unfair Business Practices
1. Economic Theory
Full freedom to contract permits parties to structure their con-
tractual transactions in any manner that they wish. However, these
arrangements must be consistent with the AML provisions governing
unfair business practices. Potentially unfair business practices com-
prise a wide variety of vertical restraints on competitive decision-
making by the constrained party, including resale price maintenance,
exclusive dealing, and refusal to deal. Several economic rationales
exist for the prohibition against unfair business practices. These ra-
tionales include the constraint of intrabrand competition, the facilita-
tion of monopoly pricing, the coercion of company decision-making,
and the foreclosure of markets to interbrand competition. 174
a. Economic Rationales Prohibiting Unfair Business
Practices
First, competition may be severely hampered by restraining pro-
visions which are frequently included in contractual arrangements
between vertically related parties. These restrictions may be provi-
sions of contracts either between an upstream firm and the depen-
other than officers in the regular employment of a company) of a company
shall hold at the same time a position as an officer in another company or
companies in Japan whenever the effect of such an interlocking directorate
may be substantially to restrain competition in any particular field of trade.
AML, supra note 16, ch. IV, § 13, translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 227-28.
172 Id.; IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 84-85.
173 In the case of Hiroshima Railway Co. & Four Others, 20 Shinketsushu 62 (FTC, July
17, 1973), the FTC determined that the interlocking directorates of Hiroshima Railway
and Hiroshima Bus Companies were anticompetitive. Both companies were found to en-
gage in the same business, that of passenger transportation within the city of Hiroshima.
Those officers with positions in both companies were ordered to quit one of their posi-
tions. Id. See IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 84-85 (discussing the Hiroshima case).
174 These rationales, each of which underpin antitrust law, may be understood
through a survey of the extensive literature on antitrust law and its economic impacts. See,
e.g., AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 147; Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the
Rule of Reason, 53 ArrIRusr L.J. 135 (1984); HOVENCAMP, supra note 76; THE LAW & Eco-
NOMICS OF COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 147; Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and
the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHICAGo L. REV. 1 (1977).
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dent downstream distributors or between the upstream
subcontractors dependent on the contracting downstream firm.
Long-term contracting between these firms establishes a fixed align-
ment of the interests of the dependent firm with those of the domi-
nant firm. This eliminates competition, termed "intrabrand
competition," between potential competitors of the dependent firm.
Dependent firms need not compete either in terms of cost or in
terms of quality in order to maintain the patronage of the dominant
firm. 17
5
Second, the manipulation of prices by dominant firms may be
facilitated by the alignment of firms into vertical chains. A dominant
firm may dictate to its distributor not only the price the distributor
must pay the dominant firm, but also the price the distributor must
charge customers. This allows the dominant firm to preserve for it-
self any excess profit extracted from the ultimate customers. The
extraction of monopoly rents from ultimate customers adversely af-
fects overall consumer welfare.176
Third, independent company decision-making may be inhibited
by the stronger bargaining position enjoyed by the dominant firm in
negotiation with the dependent firm. Two anticompetitive effects
may result from the leverage of the dominant company. The domi-
nant firm may be tempted to abuse its dominant position in order to
obtain an advantage at the expense of the dependent firm; the verti-
cal restrictions that may result will reflect the coercive influence of
the dominant firm over the dependent firm. In addition, coercion of
the dependent firm may lead to the inclusion of contractual provi-
sions offensive to intrabrand competition or interbrand
competition. 77
Finally, markets may be foreclosed to interbrand competition
through the use of vertical restrictions. This foreclosure may result
even when explicit anticompetitive clauses are not included in the
contracts of dependent firms. For example, any efficiency gained
through alignment of firm interests reduces the costs of affiliated
firms relative to those of unaffiliated companies. In order to achieve
similar efficiencies and long-term cost reductions, it is necessary for
competitor firms participating in single product markets to enter all
the product markets contributing to the achievement of efficiency.
This requirement of multiple market entry markedly increases the
175 See sources cited supra note 174.
176 See sources cited supra note 174.
177 Coercion is particularly offensive when considered in the context of the principle
of alienation. This principle dictates that a property, once alienated, should no longer be
subject to the control of the alienating party. Where a dominant firm alienates its product
to a downstream firm, its influence over that product and its pricing should end. Domi-
nant firm coercion defeats this. See THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION POLICY,
supra note 147, at I11.
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front-end cost of entering any single market and thereby bars entry
for many competitor firms.I7 8
In addition, the alignment of dependent firms with dominant
firms in vertical chains reduces the number and, possibly, the quality
of unaffiliated firms with which other firms may align themselves.
Quality differences between affiliated players and unaffiliated ones
may pose a further serious barrier to the entry of potential players
into the relevant market; these differences may force unaffiliated cur-
rent players to exit the market. Both of these market foreclosure ef-
fects may reduce interbrand competition. These effects carry the
greatest impact when the dominant firm enjoys a substantial pre-
dominance in the market. In other cases, market foreclosure effects
are far less significant. 179
b. New Efficiency Analyses
These considerations prevailed during much of the history of
antitrust law in Japan and abroad. However, it gradually became
clear that the mere evidence of the existence of most vertical restric-
tions was insufficient to determine anticompetitive results. The mar-
ket share possessed by the dominant firm is also relevant to this
determination. In recent years, additional efficiency analyses of ver-
tical alignments have been introduced into administrative or judicial
assessments of vertical restraints. These analyses consider the ef-
fects of long-term vertical restraints on economic efficiency, firm ser-
vice, and interbrand competition before characterizing a vertical
restraint as a violation of competition law.' 80
First, the alignment of firm interests reducing interbrand com-
petition allows firms to gain economic efficiency through the reduc-
tion of transaction costs. 18 1 In addition, it allows firms to share the
risks and costs of programs where all parties share an interest, in-
cluding product and process research and development, promo-
tional campaigns, and financing efforts. 182 The efficiencies created
through this alignment reduce the costs of the member firms below
those incurred in the absence of their affiliation.' 83
Second, the alignment of firm interests allows dependent firms
to devote all of their resources toward the product of the affiliated
dominant firm. 184 This reduces the waste and free-rider problems
which result from dependent firm involvement with more than one
178 See sources cited supra note 174.
179 See sources cited supra note 174.
180 See source cited infra notes 187, 219.
181 See generally supra Part II.B.2.a.
182 See generally supra Part II.B.2.b.
183 See generally supra Part II.B.2.b.
184 See generally supra Part II.C.3.b.
[VOL.. 18388
JAPANESE CORPORATE STRUCTURE
product.' 8 5 Distribution outlets are able to direct their energies to-
wards the maximum possible promotion and servicing of a single
line of products; similarly, subcontractors are able to strive toward
the development of optimal components for one single line of princi-
pal products.' 8 6
Third, and corollary to the first two outcomes, interbrand com-
petition is actually heightened through the imposition of vertical re-
straints. This assertion is not inconsistent with the earlier
characterization of vertical restraints as detrimental to interbrand
competition. While the restraints may reduce new entry into the rel-
evant markets, they heighten competition among existing players.
The reduction of costs and the improvement of service allow current
multiple market participants to compete more intensely based not
only on cost, but also on quality and service.18 7
In addition, in a corporate atmosphere where multiple market
participation is commonly achieved through either actual firm entry
or linkages established through the use of vertical restraints, these
restraints may facilitate increased interbrand competition. The entry
barriers facing a potential competitor seeking to expand into multi-
ple markets in order to attain the efficiencies permitted by broader
market participation are daunting if that firm can enter other markets
only by incurring the significant start-up costs of new entry into each
individual market. The avoidance of these heavy costs by permitting
entry into new markets through the use of vertical restraints with ex-
isting firms minimizes barriers to entry.
185 See generally supra Part II.C.3.b.
186 See generally supra Part II.C.3.b.
187 The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Serv., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992), does not negate this theory, though it has
generated a lot of controversy. In that case, Eastman Kodak attempted to tie sales of basic
photocopiers and micrographic equipment to the ongoing provision of parts and serv-
icing. Id. at 2077. Independent service organizations brought an antitrust action against
Eastman Kodak, alleging tied sales and unlawful monopolization. Id. at 2078. Eastman
Kodak claimed that it was entitled to a presumption that, because it did not have power to
affect inter-brand competition in the equipment market, therefore it could not have power
over intra-brand competition in the parts and service markets. Id. at 2081. The independ-
ent service organizations countered this theory with empirical evidence of Kodak's monop-
olization of the single-brand market for Kodak parts and service. The Supreme Court
denied Kodak's motion for summary judgment, rejecting Kodak's argument that it was
entitled to its presumption. Rather, the Supreme Court held that it was a triable issue of
fact whether the sale of parts and services was a part of the broader equipment market or
whether the distribution of parts and services constituted a distinct market subject to anti-
trust regulation. In so doing, the Court implicitly recognized the propriety of considera-
tion of single-brand markets in certain circumstances, such as when the switching costs
between the basic equipment are so high that single-brand follow-up markets are effec-
tively independent product markets. Id. at 2087. The tying of these markets through the
imposition of vertical restraints would therefore reduce inter-brand competition within the
market for parts and services and constitute an anti-competitive act. Id. at 2088. In effect,
the Court was merely recognizing the frictions inherent in this market. Id. For a discus-
sion of the implications of this case, see Charles F. Rule, Back to the Dark Ages of Antitrust,
WALL ST. J.,June 17, 1992, at A-17.
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. For example, entry into an upstream market is often only possi-
ble when accompanied by simultaneous entry into a related down-
stream market. Vertical restraints between the upstream entrant and
the downstream player would allow the upstream firm entry into
both necessary markets at the cost of entry into a single market.
Therefore, assuming that the affiliated firms do not enjoy a predomi-
nant market position that would substantially or entirely foreclose
the market, consumer welfare may actually be improved through ver-
tical restraints.
2. General Offenses
The AML prohibits' 88 unfair business practices.' 8 9 However,
the ban is not absolute, as the practices at issue must meet all three
defining conditions of the AML in order to be covered by the provi-
sion. These conditions comprise inclusion in the legal definition of
unfair business practices, impediment of "fair competition," and
designation by the FTC as unfair.' 90
First, the conformity of the alleged practice with the definitional
component of the test must be assessed. Article 2(9) of the AML
provides a broad, inclusive definition of acts that may constitute un-
fair business practices. These include conspiring to refuse to deal
with a company, coercing affiliates not to deal with a company, un-
reasonably coercing customers to deal with oneself, unjustly prefer-
ential dealings, and abuse of bargaining position.' 9 '
Second, the effects of practices complying with the definitional
component must constitute an impediment of fair competition in or-
188 Section 19 of the AML is summary in its language: "No entrepreneur shall employ
unfair business practices." AML, supra note 16, ch. V, § 19, translated in IYORI & UESUGI,
supra note 16, at 231.
189 Section 2(9), which defines "unfair business practices" under the AML, determines
the coverage of Section 19. Section 2(9) reads:
The term "unfair business practice" as used in this Act means any act coming
under one of the following paragraphs which tends to impede fair competi-
tion and which is designated by the Fair Trade Commission:
i) Unduly discriminating against other entrepreneurs;
ii) Dealing at undue prices;
iii) Unreasonably inducing or coercing customers of a com-
petitor to deal with oneself;
iv) Trading with another party on such conditions as will re-
strict unjustly the business activities of the said party;
v) Dealing with another party by unwarranted use of one's
bargaining position;
vi) Unjustly interfering with a transaction between an entre-
preneur who competes in Japan with oneself or the company of
which oneself is a stockholder or an officer and his customers;
or, in case such entrepreneur is a company, unjustly inducing,
instigating, or coercing a stockholder or an officer of such com-
pany to act against the interest of such company.
Id. ch. I, § 2(9), translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 231.
190 Id.
'91 Id.
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der to be actionable by the FTC. 192 The standard by which to assess
the impediment of fair competition has varied over time and has dif-
fered according to the type of practice. These variations are ex-
amined below. 193
Third, all practices meeting the first two components of the test
must be designated as an unfair practice by the FTC.' 94 These des-
ignations may be one of two sorts, general notification or specific
notification.' 95 The former method constitutes a generally applica-
ble specification of the acts described in the defining provision of the
AML; the latter designation makes unfair specific practices of indi-
vidual industries.' 96 The limited coverage of the second method 97
and space constraints mandate a focus on the first method alone.
General designation is currently defined in the 1982 FTC Notifica-
tion Number 15,198 which lists sixteen offending practices. 199 Many
of these practices have possible relevance to the conduct of keiretsu,
including resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, refusal to
deal, and abuse of dominant bargaining position.
Because litigation is relatively rare in Japan, few judicial state-
ments on antitrust standards exist. The antitrust activities most rig-
192 Id.
193 See infra Parts III.B.2.d-g.
194 The procedure is provided in Sections 71 and 72 of the AML. Section 71 provides
that:
The Fair Trade Commission shall, when it designates specific business prac-
tices in the particular field of business in accordance with the provisions of
Section 2(9), first hear the views of entrepreneurs operating in the same line
of business as that of the entrepreneurs who employ the specific business
practices concerned, hold a public hearing to obtain the views of the public
and thereupon shall make the designation after due consideration of the
views disclosed.
AML, supra note 16, ch. VIII, § 71, translated in IYoRi & UEsuGI, supra note 16, at 255.
Section 72 states: "Designation under the provisions of Section 2(9) shall be made by a
notification." Id. ch. VIII, § 72, translated in IYoRI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 255.
195 IYORI & UESUGi, supra note 16, at 92-94.
196 Id.
197 Specific notification may be provided to offending industries; often these notifica-
tions are of a temporary duration, pending the elimination of the unfair practice. Past
notifications have been directed at a wide range of abusive practices, including offering
premiums, misleading representations, abuse of bargaining position, and price discrimina-
tion. Id. at 105-06.
198 Fair Trade Commission (Japan) Notification No. 15 of 1982 [hereinafter FTC Noti-
fication No. 15], translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, app. I, at 265-66. This rela-
tively recent Notification replaced the long-standing FTC Notification No. 11 of 1953,
which contained the original general notification of eleven offending practices. Following
allegations of undue vagueness and abstraction, FTC Notification No. 15 was issued.
199 The practices covered by the FTC Notification No. 15 include: Concerted Refusal
to Deal; Other Refusal to Deal; Price Discrimination; Discriminatory Treatment (Transac-
tion); Discriminatory Treatment (Trade Assoc.); Unjustly Low Pricing; Unjustly High Pric-
ing; Misleading Representations; Customer Inducement by Unjust Benefit; Tied Sales;
Coercion; Reciprocal Exclusive Dealing; Resale Price Maintenance; Other Exclusive Deal-
ing; Abuse of Dominant Position; Interference with Competitor Transaction; and Interfer-
ence with Competitor Operation. FTC Notification No. 15, supra note 198, translated in
IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, app. I, at 266-69.
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idly regulated by the FTC and most extensively addressed by the
Japanese courts comprise horizontal price/output manipulations, re-
sale price maintenance, and exclusive dealing. 200 Only the last two
activities are relevant to an analysis of unfair business practices. 20'
Additionally, the possibility of abuse of dominant position and re-
fusal to deal in keiretsu relationships should be considered.
a. Resale Price Maintenance
Resale price maintenance involves the enforced fixing of prices
at artificial levels. It allows firms to extract monopoly rents from
consumers through the anticompetitive enforcement of price levels.
Except in the limited circumstances outlined in the AML, 20 2 this
form of vertical restraint is illegal under the AML and the related
FTC Notification Number. 203 The Japanese courts have condemned
unequivocally this practice, 20 4 applying a standard that approximates
200 Haley, Japanese Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 25, at 360.
201 Id.
202 Section 24-2 of the AML provides an exemption to the illegality of resale price
maintenance in limited situations:
(1) The provisions of this Act shall not apply to legitimate acts performed
by an entrepreneur who produces or sells a commodity, the uniform quality
of which is easily identifiable and which is designated by the Fair Trade Com-
mission, and by another entrepreneur who buys such commodity, in order to
fix and maintain the resale price thereof (the resale price means hereinafter
the price at which the latter entrepreneur or a third entrepreneur who
purchases from him sells such commodity): Provided, that the foregoing
shall not apply if the said act tends to be grossly injurious to the interest of
consumers in general or if it is done against the will of the entrepreneur who
produces it, by an entrepreneur whose business is to sell the said commodity.
(2) The Fair Trade Commission shall not designate a commodity under the
provisions of the preceding subsection unless it fulfills each of the following
requirements:
i) The commodity shall be for the daily use of the consumers
in general;
ii) Free competition shall exist with respect to the commodity.
AML, supra note 16, ch. VI, § 24-2, translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 232-34.
203 FTC Notification No. 15 defines "resale price maintenance" as follows:
(12) Supplying a commodity to the opposite transacting party who
purchases the said commodity from oneself while imposing, without proper
justification, one of the restrictive terms specified below:
(a) Causing the said party to maintain the sales price of the
commodity that one has determined, or otherwise restricting
the said party's free decision on sales price of the commodity,
or
(b) Having the said party cause an entrepreneur who
purchases the commodity from the said party to maintain the
sales price of the commodity that one has determined, or other-
wise causing the said party to restrict the said entrepreneurs
free decision on sales price of the commodity.
FTC Notification No. 15, supra note 198, translated in IYORI & UEsuGI, supra note 16, at 268.
204 Judicial statements have been made in connection with this practice in the three
"Powdered Milk Cases", in which resale price maintenance arrangements were utilized by
the various parties. See, e.g., In re Wakodo K.K., 15 Shinketsushu 84 (FTC Decision No. 3
of 1966, Oct. 11, 1968), aff'd on First Appeal (kokoku), Wakodo K.K. v. FTC, 18 Shinket-
sushu 214 (Tokyo High.CourtJuly 17, 1971), aff'd on SecondAppeal (jokoku), 29 MINSHu 888
(Supreme Court, 1st P.B., July 10, 1975); In re Morinaga Shoji K.K., 15 Shinketsushu 84
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the North American standard of "per se illegality."'20 5 According to
this standard, once proven, price maintenance practices are con-
demned regardless of their market effects because they are always
assumed to be anticompetitive.20 6 Although the Japanese Supreme
Court has recognized the economic efficiency created by the en-
hancement of interbrand competition through price maintenance, it
ruled that a company with a nondominant market position is prohib-
ited from engaging in this anticompetitive practice because of the
restriction it imposes on intrabrand competition. 20 7
The dearth of recent litigation 208 prevents a determination on
the continued existence of this rigid standard. A similar standard of
illegality was originally applied in the United States. 20 9 The United
States rule since has been supplanted by a quantitative substantiality
standard that attempts to incorporate the economic efficiencies of
both increased interbrand competition and reduction in market fore-
closure into the determination of the illegality of resale price mainte-
nance.210 Moreover, Japanese courts have eased the similarly
rigorous standards once applied to the other forms of vertical re-
straint, discussed below. 2 1' The latter two occurrences may fore-
shadow a broadening of the Japanese judicial standard for resale
price maintenance.
(FTC Decision No. 2 of 1966, Oct. 11, 1968); In re Meiji Shoji K.K., 15 Shinketsushu 67
(FTC Decision No. 1 of 1966, Oct. 11, 1968), aff'd on First Appeal (kokoku), Meiji Shoji K.K.
v. FTC, 18 Shinketsushu 167 (Tokyo High Court July 17, 1971), aff'd on Second Appeal
(jokoku), 29 Minshu 951 (Supreme Court 2d P.B. July 11, 1975). For a discussion of these
cases, see IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 102.
205 See sources cited supra note 204.
206 See sources cited supra note 204.
207 In Wakodo K.K., 29 Minshu at 888, the Supreme Court was confronted with a com-
pany with third place in market share in the powdered milk industry. Despite the efficiency
gain to be had from enhanced small company competition facilitated by resale price main-
tenance agreements, the Court condemned the practice. Id. For a discussion of the case,
see IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 102.
208 The most recent major court rulings were in 1975. Wakodo K.K., 29 Minshu at 888;
Meiji Shoji K.K., 29 Minshu at 951.
209 In the early case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911), the Court ruled that resale price maintenance is illegal, per se, as a restraint of
competition forbidden under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat.
209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
210 The early U.S. standard of per se illegality was eroded over the years by several
conflicting judgments. In recent years, the Supreme Court has placed increasing emphasis
on the economic efficiency of increased interbrand competition. In the case of Continental
T. V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Supreme Court ruled that vertical
contractual restrictions which reduce intrabrand competition but increase interbrand com-
petition would be tolerated. Similarly, in Business Electric Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485
U.S. 717, cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1005 (1988), the Court allowed the pro-competitive effects
of heightened interbrand competition to affect its assessment of vertical restraints. For
elaboration on the standard by which resale price maintenance is assessed, see Frank
Mathewson & Ralph Winter, The Law of Economics and Vertical Restraints, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 147, at 113-16.
211 See infra Parts III.C.2.b-d.
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b. Exclusive Dealing
Exclusive dealing may assume one of two forms: either the
downstream firm requires the upstream firm to sell to it all of its
output, or the upstream firm requires the downstream firm to buy
only its output. Both forms amount to a secondary boycott of the
competitors of the constraining firm.2 12 In many instances, this form
of vertical restraint is illegal under the AML and the related FTC
Notification Number 15.213
The standard by which this offensive practice is assessed differs
from that by which resale price maintenance is judged. Until re-
cently, a quantitative substantiality test that stressed the market share
of the firm and the consequent effects of exclusive dealings on com-
petitor market share was applied. 214 In a recent judgment,2 15 this
test was broadened into a qualitative substantiality test.21 6 This eval-
uation incorporates both quantitative market share considerations
and mitigating qualitative factors2 17 in an analysis of the efficiencies
created by exclusive dealing arrangements and the actual effects of
the restraint on the relevant market.218 This standard parallels a
212 Mathewson & Winter, supra note 210, at 127.
213 FTC Notification No. 15 describes the illegal forms of exclusive dealing as follows:
(11) Unjustly dealing with the opposite transacting party on condition that
the said party shall not deal with a competitor, thereby tending to reduce
transaction opportunities for the said competitor.
FTC Notification No. 15, supra note 198, translated in IYORI & UESUG1, supra note 16, at 268.
214 In three cases in which leading manufacturers incorporated both exclusive dealing
clauses and resale price maintenance provisions into distributor contracts, the FTC based
its determinations almost entirely on the significant market share held by each of the of-
fending upstream companies. In re Muto Kogyo K.K., 21 Shinketsushu 148 (FTC [Recom-
mendation] No. 44, Nov. 22, 1974); In re Pijon K.K., 22 Shinketsushu 115 (FTC
[Recommendation] No. 33, Jan. 7, 1976); In re France Bed K.K., 22 Shinketsushu 127
(FTC [Recommendation] No. 2, Feb. 20, 1976). For additional discussion of these cases,
see Thomas R. Radcliffe, Exclusive Dealing Arrangements Under Japanese Antimonopoly Law: The
Toyo Seimaki Case, 18 L. JAPAN 76, 80 (1986); Covey, supra note 117, at 74-75.
215 Toyo Seimaki v. FTC, 1106 Hanji 47, 49 (Tokyo High Ct., Feb. 17, 1984). In this
case, the appellant manufacturer with the leading market share in retail rice industry
equipment included exclusive dealing provisions in its distributor contracts. After the
FTC made its determination based exclusively on the quantitative substantiality test that
stressed market share, the manufacturer appealed. The result was the application of the
new qualitative substantiality standard by the Tokyo High Court. Id.
216 Radcliffe, supra note 214, at 88.
217 To assess the actual impact of the arrangement on the relevant market, the Toyo
Seimaki court considered several factors. These factors included the distribution level af-
fected .(i.e. wholesale, retail, etc.), the type of product affected (durable goods, conven-
ience goods, etc.), the number of competitors in the upstream and downstream markets,
the difficulty inherent in establishing alternative distribution channels, the fluctuations in
the market share of the upstream firm and its competitors, the duration of the exclusive
dealing agreement, and the extent of channelization characteristic of the industry. Toyo
Seimaki, Hanrei Jiho (No. 1106) at 54-55.
218 The Toyo Seimaki court stressed the importance of assessing not only the firm's
market share, but also the effect of the arrangement on competitors. The court stated:
[T]he existence of the possibility of hindering fair competition, as such, after
all, should be decided upon examination of the extent to which the exclusive
dealing condition would limit the distribution routes which can be used by
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similar United States qualitative rule of reason developed in recent
jurisprudence. 2 19
Rebates often are used in order to foster exclusive dealing.220
The courts raise a presumption of illegality when rebates are large or
steeply progressive or when their method of calculation is un-
clear. 22 1 The uses of sales share rebates (senyu ritsu), those correlated
with the percentage of total share of a specific brand, and progres-
sive rebates (ruishin), those variable with increases in sales, have been
ruled illegal when substantial market foreclosure results. 222 Because
of the lack of any recent judicial statements on this matter, it is un-
clear whether this more rigid quantitative standard applying to re-
bates persists following the adoption of the broader qualitative
substantiality rule with respect to other forms of exclusive dealing.
c. Abuse of Dominant Position
A firm, whether upstream or downstream, may abuse its domi-
nant bargaining position when it exerts coercive influence over other
firms concerning the nonprice terms of a transaction. 223 This of-
competitors. Generally speaking, if an enterprise in an influential position in
a given trade engages in exclusive dealing transactions with a considerable
number of distributors, such transactions are in principle to be considered as
having the characteristic of hindering trade. However, even in such a case, if,
due to the special nature of the market structure of the given trade, distribu-
tors are in actuality, aligned in special transaction channels of specific enter-
prises whereby such distributors are to handle only the products of such
enterprises, such a special situation may raise the possibility that the exclu-
sive dealing arrangement may be considered not to hinder fair trade.
Id. at 55.
219 Recent U.S. administrative decisions and court rulings dropped the earlier rigid
adherence to market share as the sole determinant of the reasonability of exclusive dealing
arrangements. Instead, these decisions adopted a "rule of reason" standard, finding that
several factors in addition to market share are relevant to the "exclusive dealing" analysis.
See, e.g., Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005
(1988) (endorsing the rule of reason standard); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
365 U.S. 320 (1961); In re Beltone Elec. Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68 (1982). For example, in
Beltone Electronics, several factors in addition to market share were considered relevant. In-
cluded among these are careful delineation of the relevant market, the amount of actual
foreclosure in that market, the duration of the exclusive dealing arrangement, and the
justifiability of the arrangements. Beltone Elec. Corp., 100 F.T.C. at 68. See also Tampa Elec.
Co., 365 U.S. at 320 (Court evaluated the exclusive dealing contract by considering factors
such as the economic impact of the contract on the relevant market, the foreclosure of that
market, the duration of the restraint, and the claimed justification for the restraint; the
Court concluded that exclusive dealing contract was justified in this case).
220 Covey, supra note 117, at 72.
221 Id. at 72.
222 See In re Pijon K.K., 22 Shinketsushu 115 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 33, Jan. 7,
1976); In re Taisho Seiyaku K.K. (2), 7 Shinketsushu 99 (FTC [Recommendation] No. 3,
Dec. 10, 1955); In re Taisho Seiyaku K.K. (1), 4 Shinketsushu 119 (FTC [Recommenda-
tion] No. 1, March 28, 1953).
223 FTC Notification No. 15 describes actionable abuse of dominant position in the
following terms:
(14) Taking any act specified in one of the following subparagraphs, un-
justly in the light of the normal business practices, by making use of one's
dominant bargaining position over the opposite transacting party:
396 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 18
fense is evaluated based on the standard of normal conduct for nego-
tiation among parties of equal economic standing.22 4 If the
dominant party's behaviour is considered unduly harmful to the
other party, the dominant party may be held in violation of the rele-
vant Notification provision.2 25 The extent of market share held by
the dominant firm has no relevance to this determination; the sole
determinant is the relationship between the two firms.226 Because
the determination of an abuse of position is a difficult one, it is gen-
erally accompanied by a specific designation as an unfair practice.2 27
The General Notification may not always be sufficient to clearly des-
ignate individual practices. 228
d. Refusal To Deal
Refusal to deal violates the AML 229 only when it is either the
product of collusion between two or more firms or is the result of the
(a) Causing the said party in continuous transaction to
purchase a commodity or service other than the one involved in
the said transaction,
(b) Causing the said party in continuous transaction to pro-
vide for oneself money, service or other economic benefits,
(c) Setting or changing transaction terms in a way disadvanta-
geous to the said party,
(d) In addition to any act coming.under the preceding three
subparagraphs, imposing a disadvantage on the said party re-
garding terms or execution of transaction, or
(e) Causing a company which is one's opposite transacting
party to follow one's direction in advance, or to get one's ap-
proval, regarding the appointment of officers of the said com-
pany (meaning those as defined in Paragraph 3 of Section 2 of
the Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Main-
tenance of Fair Trade).
FTC Notification No. 15, supra note 198, translated in IvoRI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 269.
224 Id.
225 IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 103.
226 See Snow Brand Dairy Co., 24 Shinketsushu 65 (FTC, Nov. 28, 1977); Meiji Dairy
Co., 24 Shinketsushu 86 (FTC, Nov. 28, 1977); Mitsubishi Bank, 9 Shinketsushu 1 (FTC,
June 3, 1957); Taisho Pharmaceutical Co., 7 Shinketsushu 99 (FTC, Dec. 10, 1955); Nip-
pon Kogyo Bank, 5 Shinketsushu 61 (FTC, Nov'. 6, 1953); IvoRI & UEsuGI, supra note 16,
at 100-04.
227 See sources cited supra note 226.
228 See sources cited supra note 226.
229 FTC Notification No. 15 defines refusal to deal as follows:
(1) Without proper justification, taking an act specified in one of the follow-
ing subparagraphs concertedly with another entrepreneur who are in a com-
petitive relationship with oneself (hereinafter, referred to as "competitor"):
(a) Refusing to deal with a certain entrepreneur or restricting
the quantity or substance of a commodity or service involved in
the transaction with a certain entrepreneur, or
(b) Causing another entrepreneur to take an act which comes
under the preceding subparagraph.
(2) Unjustly refusing to deal, or restricting the quantity or substance of
commodities or services involved in the transaction with a certain entrepre-
neur, or causing another entrepreneur to take any act which comes under
one of these categories."
FTC Notification No. 15, supra note 198, translated in IYoRt & UEsuGI, supra note 16, at 266-
67.
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efforts of a market-dominating firm.230 Absent market dominance,
refusal to deal by an independent enterprise is not actionable. 231
Refusal to deal is generally a symptom of other anticompetitive
forms of transacting and is rarely an independent offensive act. It
provides a necessary additional cause of action when the primary an-
ticompetitive activity is neither easily discerned nor clearly
evidenced. 232
IV. Analysis: Keiretsu Under the Competition Law
A. Shareholdings and Directorates
Keiretsu relationships constructed with extensive intercorporate
shareholding and interlocking directorates are susceptible to claims
of anticompetitiveness. These relationships must violate provisions
of the AML in order to constitute valid assertions of illegality. Each
of the AML provisions will be examined in this context.
The existence of holding companies in keiretsu structures would
be immediately actionable.2 33 However, the absence of holding
companies from keiretsu is axiomatic. The lack of an identifiable con-
trolling party is one of the essential defining characteristics of the
keiretsu.
Equity ownership violating the qualitative prohibition against
substantial restraint of trade would violate the AML.2 34 Precedent
indicates that a restraint finding will only be made when the investing
company and target firm engage in the same economic activity;
230 In Taisho Pharmaceutical Co., 7 Shinketsushu at 99, the FTC ruled that actions of an
independent entrepreneur constituted refusal to deal. Id. See also IYoaI & UESUGI, supra
note 16, at 103 (briefly discussing case and its holding).
231 Id. at 97.
232 This assessment of refusal to deal is similar to the one employed in the United
States under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which bans.restraint of competition.
Concerted activities by two or more firms or restrictive activities by a monopolist may
constitute an actionable refusal to deal. Lorainjournal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143
(1951) (enjoining newspaper which had almost complete control over the media advertis-
ing in a local area from refusing to accept advertisements from businesses which also
chose to advertise with a competing radio station); Fashion Originators' Guild v. F.T.C.,
312 U.S. 457 (1941) (enjoining group which tended to control garment manufacturing
industry from refusing to sell to retailers when the effect was to foreclose the market for
other garment manufacturers); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (individual retailers had the right not to deal with wholesalers,
but group of retailers acted anticompetitively when they conspired not to deal with certain
wholesalers). An independent enterprise is considered free to deal and not to deal with
the parties of its choice. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S..300 (1919) ("In the
absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the
long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.
And, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse
to sell."). See also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (allowing state-run operation
to stop selling to out-of-state customer in favor of protecting the interests of its citizens);
Mathewson & Winter, supra note 210 (discussing vertical restraints generally).
233 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
234 See supra Part III.B. 1.
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keiretsu companies engaging in substantially different forms of activity
would not be susceptible. 235 An action should be successful only
when three elements exist, an equity relationship linking two keiretsu
companies involved in the same economic activity, substantial re-
straint of trade, and causation of the restraint of trade by the cross-
shareholding.23 6
Equity stakes violating the quantitative restrictions might give
rise to a successful action under the AML provision. However, the
close attention paid by investing companies to these provisions ren-
ders this result unlikely. Shareholdings held by large keiretsu banks
and financial service companies are problematic only if they exceed
the allowable five to ten percent share. 23 7 Similarly, the equity stakes
of sogo shosha and large enterprises are actionable only if they are in
excess of the level permitted to large companies by the quantitative
restriction in the AML. 238
Interlocking directorates of companies would be troublesome
only if competition between the linked companies is substantially
limited as a result. 239 The leading FTC ruling on this matter indi-
cates that keiretsu firms are prohibited from exchanges of directors
when the firms engage in similar economic activities.240 However,
typical keiretsu arrangements such as the interchange of directors and
the meeting of company presidents from companies involved in dif-
ferent economic activities appear not to violate the provisions.
Overall, keiretsu shareholding and directorate practices seem less
susceptible to legal challenges on grounds of antitrust violations.
B. Unfair Business Practices
The functional inter-relationship of keiretsu companies accom-
plished through extensive intra-keiretsu contracting for goods and
services often involves business practices vulnerable to claims of un-
fairness. As noted above, 241 vertical keiretsu may engage in any of
several forms of vertical restraint, while horizontal keiretsu typically
engage in reciprocal dealings. Principal companies in both forms of
keiretsu may engage in an abuse of their dominant positions. 242 A
determination of the actual existence of AML violations requires a
detailed assessment of individual company practices. It is important
235 See supra Part III.B.2.
236 See generally supra Parts III.B. 1-2.
237 See generally supra Parts III.B.1-2.
238 See generally supra Parts III.B.I-2.
239 See generally supra Part III.B.2.
240 Hiroshima Ry. Co. & 4 Others, 20 Shinketsushu 62 (FTC, July 17, 1973). In that
case, the FTC ordered officers who held key positions with both a railway and a bus com-
pany to resign from one of the companies. Id. See also IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 84
(discussing case).
241 See supra Parts II.C.2-3.
242 See supra Part III.C.2.c.
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to recognize in all cases that restraint may be achieved through
either contractual or noncontractual arrangements between an up-
stream firm and downstream firm. Some generalized statements may
facilitate the understanding of the competitive nature of keiretsu
practices.
Resale price maintenance utilized in keiretsu distribution prac-
tices may be vulnerable to a successful challenge, particularly in light
of the relative vigour with which the FTC has pursued this form of
violation. 243 The possibility of a successful challenge is enhanced by
the rigid judicial standard approximating per se illegality applied to
resale price maintenance in the past.2 44 This standard requires evi-
dence only of the existence of the practice and not of its anticompeti-
tive effects on firm market share and efficiencies. 245
However, developments in the standards for assessing exclusive
dealings in Japan and resale price maintenance in the United States
may foreshadow a broadening of the judicial standard applied to re-
sale price maintenance in Japan.246 The new rule would incorporate
quantitative or qualitative elements. In general, the continued exist-
ence of resale price maintenance in keiretsu relationships may be one
cause of the systemic high prices faced by Japanese consumers; in-
vestigation should be undertaken to assess the likelihood of success
in challenging this practice.
Exclusive dealing will not be easily challenged. Following the
recent ruling of the Tokyo High Court, exclusive dealing is subject to
a qualitative substantiality test. Proof of the mere existence of intra-
keiretsu dealings is insufficient to attach antitrust liability to compa-
nies. Consideration must be given not only to the market share held
by the constraining firm, but also to the factors mitigating the impo-
sition of restraints. 247 Such an analysis would likely permit the con-
tinuation of many of the keiretsu transactions.
The fierce interbrand competition in the industries in which
keiretsu are active limits keiretsu firm market share in these sectors. 248
The exclusive dealings of any single keiretsu would be insufficient to
have substantial market foreclosure effects. Further, mitigating fac-
tors include the significant number of firms in competition with the
constraining firm in many of these industries and the large degree of
channelization and firm alignment typical of many of these indus-
tries. The keiretsu may argue thatJapan's corporate history and close-
knit culture are mitigating factors by themselves. The combination
243 See supra Part III.C.2.a.
244 See supra Part III.C.2.a.
245 See supra Part I1.C.2.a.
246 See supra Part III.C.2.a..
247 Toyo Seimaki v. FTC, Hanrei Jiho (No. 1106) 47 (Tokyo High Court, Feb. 17,
1984).
248 See supra Part III.C.2.b.
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of these elements renders the successful challenge of keiretsu exclu-
sive dealing arrangements extremely unlikely. This should not pre-
clude antitrust action, however, in instances when these elements are
lacking.
Reciprocal dealings between members of horizontal keiretsu need
not be exclusive.2 49 If they are not exclusive, the principle of free-
dom of contract and the economic efficiencies realized through intra-
keiretsu transactions fully justify the practice and make it appear unas-
sailable on the basis of antitrust law. If the reciprocal dealings were
exclusive, they might be successfully challenged under antitrust
principles.
Refusal to deal may be a ground for challenging keiretsu practices
that may not be as easily characterized as other forms of antitrust
violations.2 50 However, success is not likely in the absence of con-
certed refusals to deal or market dominance.25' When neither of
these conditions exist, keiretsu firms are free to deal and to refuse to
deal with the firms of their choice. Neither condition typifies keiretsu
transactions. Intense interbrand competition belies the existence of
concerted inter-keiretsu refusal to deal. This same fierce interbrand
competition denies any single keiretsu the ability to attain a market
dominating position from which its refusal to deal would constitute
an unfair business practice.
Abuse of dominant positions may pervade keiretsu dealings. 252 If
intra-keiretsu negotiations involve coercion of the.dependent firm to
accept nonprice terms harmful to its interests, the dominant party
may have abused its position.253 This appears likely in vertical
keiretsu arrangements and transactions involving the principal manu-
facturer and its affiliates. It may also be true of some horizontal
keiretsu and the relations between the central sogo shosha and the bank
and other firms in the keiretsu.
The terms which the central firms impose on the dependent
firms are the product of vast discrepancies in the leverage available
to each firm. Because similar terms probably would not result from
negotiations between firms of equal economic power, the imposition
of terms in many keiretsu relationships appears to constitute actiona-
ble abuses of dominant position. However, despite the apparent
abuse of negotiating position, a successful challenge is by no means
assured. While short-term firm interests may be harmed by terms
imposed by abusive negotiations with a principal firm, long-term
firm interest is certainly furthered by the relationship accompanying
249 See generally supra Part II.B.2.a.
250 See supra Part III.C.2.d.
251 See supra Part III.C.2.d.
252 See generally supra Part III.C.2.c.
253 See supra Part III.C.2.b.
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the imposed terms. The FTC General Notification is inadequate in
order to contend with this dilemma.254 Therefore, specific FTC no-
tification is required to treat each situation individually.
C. Evidentiary Burden
Even when anticompetitive acts meeting the definitions and ju-
dicial standards of the law exist, the evidentiary burden is often in-
surmountable. This situation results from the frequent absence of
unassailable written evidence and the reluctance of dependent Japa-
nese firms to undertake conflictive litigation. 255 The dependent
firms' reluctance derives from their fear of the harm that litigation
would cause to their ongoing relations with dominant firms and the
Japanese societal reluctance to engage in excessively litigious
behaviour.256
In order to facilitate the identification of keiretsu relationships
and to ease the related evidentiary burden, Japanese law now re-
quires disclosure of relationships that are typical of keiretsu.257 The
relationships that must be disclosed include not only intercorporate
shareholding and interlocking directorates, but also relational con-
tracting.2 58 These disclosure measures are intended only to reveal
the existence of keiretsu. They are not sufficient to satisfy the eviden-
tiary burden required to support allegations of anticompetitive
activity.
First, the AML requires disclosure by companies of cross-corpo-
rate shareholdings 259 and directorates. 260 In addition, in order to
enhance the transparency of keiretsu equity relationships, the Ministry
of Finance (MOF) recently promulgated new regulations requiring
disclosure of the beneficial ownership of an equity stake in excess of
five percent of the outstanding voting shares of a company. 261 The
254 See FTC Notification No. 15, supra note 198, translated in IYoRI & UESUGI, supra note
16, at 266-67.
255 Punke, supra note 1, at 77-78.
256 See Haley,Japanese Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 25, at 335; Haley, Luck, Law, Cul-
ture & Trade, supra note 25, at 403.
257 AML, supra note 16, ch. IV, translated in IYORI & UESUG1, supra note 16, at 222-30.
258 Id. ch. IV, § 13(3), translated in IvORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 228.
259 Section 10(2) of the AML requires the filing of an annual shareholding report by
every domestic non-financial company in Japan with assets in excess of two billion yen and
every foreign non-financial company when those companies own stock in another com-
pany in Japan, held by either the company itself or by a trustee. AML, supra note 16, ch.
IV, § 10(2), translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 226.
260 Section 13(3) of the AML requires the filing of a report upon the assumption by an
officer or employee of one company of the position of officer with another company in
competition with it in Japan. This requirement exists only where one of the two subject
companies has assets in excess of two billion yen. Id. ch. IV, § 13(3), translated in IYOIU &
UESUG1, supra note 16, at 228.
261 These regulations, which took effect December 1, 1990, were issued in response to
commitments undertaken by the Japanese Government during earlier stages of the Struc-
tural Impediments Initiative negotiations. See Laurence W. Bates, Japan's New Disclosure
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report must include information on the purpose of share ownership
and the existence of significant contractual or equity-related relation-
ships between the parties. 262
Although these regulations are intended to foster the visibility
of keiretsu and allow for antitrust action to be taken when appropriate,
their impact should be minimal. The noted low level of share owner-
ship by keiretsu firms protects many equity relationships from disclo-
sure.263 These regulations would have greater effect if keiretsu firms
held excessive stakes through proxy companies in evasion of the
AML; it is by no means clear that such a situation currently exists.
Second, the new Related Party Transaction Regulations, 264
promulgated by the MOF, mandate the disclosure of all "significant
transactions" between "related parties" in order to elevate the visi-
bility of keiretsu relationships. 265 The definition of "related parties"
extends beyond parties connected through equity relationships to in-
clude parties linked by significant financial, operational, and manage-
rial relationships.2 66  Similarly, the definition of "significant
transactions" includes a variety of financial and operational transac-
tions.267 Because the definition of these terms in the Regulations
allows for a great deal of flexibility in the determination of "related
parties" and "significant transactions," they are valuable in exposing
the keiretsu, which are characterized by fluidity.
D. Sanctions
When the legal and evidentiary burdens are met, the AML pro-
vides sanctions. Violations of the shareholding and directorate pro-
Rules and Keiretsu Relationships, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., June 15, 1991, at 7 (discussing these
regulations and their potential impact).
262 The new regulation is intended to give a truer picture of intra-keiretsu ownership of
affiliate firms. The requisite disclosure covers all securities, actual and potential, that are
owned beneficially by a person or a group of persons. Id. at 12.
263 See supra Part II.B. .a.
264 The Related Party Transaction Regulations were similarly issued as a result of the
Structural Impediments Initiative. They were promulgated on December 25, 1990 and
took effect on April 1, 1991. Bates, supra note 261, at 12.
265 Id.
266 The Related Party Transaction Regulations identify "related parties" according to
the following connections:
1) significant shareholdings by parent, subsidiary, and affiliate companies;
by major shareholders, both corporate and individual; by directors and their
immediate families; by associated companies, their directors and subsidiaries;
and by commonly-controlled companies.
2) significant shareholding of actual or potential voting securities.
3) appointment of a high-level executive or a substantial portion of the
board of directors.
4) substantial financial or operational transactions.
5) other significant factors not expressly outlined.
For more information, see id. at 12.
267 The Related Party Transaction Regulations define "significant transactions" to in-
clude "substantial sales transactions," "substantial financial transactions," and "substan-
tial capital transactions." Id. at 13.
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visions may be met with a criminal penalty, either a fine or a term of
imprisonment or some combination of both punishments. 26 8 In the
alternative, these violations may be corrected by FTC remedial meas-
ures including forced dispositions of offensive shareholding, forced
resignations of officers holding offending positions in a company,
and any other necessary measures. 269 Only FTC remedial measures
such as an order to cease and desist the offending practice or an or-
der to delete violating contractual clauses may be used against unfair
business practice violations. 270 If a final order is violated, a criminal
fine and/or a prison term may be imposed on the offender. In the
alternative, an administrative fine may be imposed on the violator.2 71
The apparent severity of the AML sanctions, both criminal and
268 Section 91 of the AML states that "Any person committing one of the following
offenses shall be punished by penal servitude for not more than one year or by a fine of not
more than two million yen .. " AML, supra note 16, ch. X, § 91, translated in IYom &
UESUGI, supra note 16, at 259-60. The offenses named in this provision include improper
or excessive shareholdings and improperly held positions in more than one company. Id.
269 Section 17-2 of the AML outlines the remedial measures that may be taken:
(1) Where there exists any act in violation of the provisions of Section 9-
2(1), 10, 11(1), 15(1) (including such cases where the said provisions are ap-
plied mutatis mutandis by Section 16) or the preceding section, the Fair Trade
Commission may, in accordance with the procedure as provided for in Divi-
sion II, Chapter VIII, order the entrepreneur concerned to submit or file a
report, or to dispose of the whole or a part of his stocks, to transfer a part of
his business, or to take any other measures necessary to eliminate such acts
in violation of the said provisions.
(2) Where there exists any act in violation of the provisions of Section 9(1)
or (2), 13, 14 or the preceding section, the Fair Trade Commission may, in
accordance with the procedure as provided for in Division II, Chapter VIII,
order the person violating such provisions to submit or file a report, or to
dispose of the whole or a part of his stocks, to resign from his position as an
officer in a company, or to take any other measures necessary to eliminate
such violation.
Id. ch. IV, § 17-2, translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 229-30.
270 Section 20 of the AML states:
When there exists any act in violation of the preceding article, the Fair Trade
Commission may, in accordance with the procedure as provided for in Divi-
sion II, Chapter VIII, order the entrepreneur concerned to cease and desist
from the said act, to delete the clauses concerned from the contract and to
take any other measures necessary to eliminate the said act.
Id. ch. V, § 20, translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 231.
271 Section 90 of the AML addresses several situations, including unlawful concerted
activity, international agreements, and non-observance of final decisions. Id. ch. X, § 90,
translated in IYORI & UESUG1, supra note 16, at 259. This provision reads:
Any person committing one of the following offenses shall be punished by
penal servitude for not more than two years or by a fine of not more than
three million yen:
iii) Any person who does not comply with the decision as pro-
vided for in Section 48(4), 53-3 or 54(1) or (2), after it has be-
come final and conclusive.
Id. The final decisions enumerated in this provision include: recommendations, id. ch.
VIII, § 48(4), translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 245; consent orders, id. ch.
VIII, § 53-3, translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 249-50; FTC decisions, id. ch.
VIII, § 54(1), translated in IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 250; and surcharge orders, id.
ch. VIII, § 54(2), translated in IYoRI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 250.
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remedial, is deceptive. First, criminal action is rarely taken. This
outcome results from many factors, including the weighty burden of
proof imposed in any criminal trial272 and the absence of sufficient
social stigma associated with anticompetitive conduct; the lack of
stigma is curious because anticompetitive behaviour constitutes con-
cealed theft from consumers. 273 Additional factors include the re-
medial nature of Japanese justice274 and the systemic over-
burdening of the Japanese procuracy that results from the dearth of
lawyers in Japan.2 75 The lack of criminal action is also motivated by
the reluctance of the FTC to undertake criminal action because of
the personal ties that connect many members of Japan's bureau-
cratic, political, and business circles.2 76 Because the FTC is reluctant
to utilize the criminal provisions available to it, the deterrent power
of the criminal provisions is extremely weak.
Second, the efficacy of administrative remedial measures,
though greater than that of criminal penalties, is still limited. This
situation derives from both the narrow scope of FTC orders and the
lack of effective sanctions in the event of corporate noncompliance
with FTC remedial measures. The narrow scope of FTC orders re-
sults from the requirement that orders redress only those facts set
out in the FTC decision. Consequently, structural causes of an an-
ticompetitive action are not treated. The lack of effective sanctions
in the event of noncompliance with a final FTC order lingers despite
the available criminal or administrative measures; neither of these
272 Criminal actions require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, civil ac-
tions require a lesser burden of proof to be met, as proof must only be on a balance of
probabilities. See generally IVORI & UESUGI, supra note 16, at 125-29 (discussing Japanese
civil and criminal procedures).
273 Curiously, anticompetitive activity that exacts higher prices from consumers is not
regarded with the same societal disdain as that reserved for common theft. While mem-
bers of society are certainly aware when they have been robbed or mugged, they are
clearly less aware of being "bushwhacked" by faceless corporations extorting society. See
KENNETH G. ELZINGA & WILLIAM BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 43 (1976).
274 In general, Japanese justice emphasizes compensation of victims and rehabilitation
of offenders. John 0. Haley, Antitrust Sanctions and Remedies: A Comparative Study of German
and Japanese Law, 59 WASH. L. REV. 471, 487 n.82 (1984) (citing John 0. Haley, Sheathing
the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law Without Sanctions, 8 J. JAPANESE STUDIES 265,
269-71 (1982)) [hereinafter Antitrust Sanctions & Remedies]. Only 2% of convicted persons
are actually imprisoned and two-thirds of prison terms are regularly suspended. Id. at 487.
Despite this apparent laxness, Japanese society is far safer and less criminalized than are
North American societies.
275 The low number of lawyers is frequently cited as one reason for the relative ab-
sence of litigation from Japanese society. See, e.g., Haley, Antitrust Sanctions & Remedies,
supra note 25, at 487 (noting the low number of prosecutors in Japan). There are approxi-
mately only 124,000 attorneys in all of Japan, or 101.6 attorneys per 100,000 population.
John Heilemann, The Rule of Lawyers, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 3. In contrast, there are
312 lawyers for every 100,000 people in the United States. More likely, the low number is
the product of a non-adversarial society that does not require a legal services establish-
ment as extensive as that required in the United States or Canada.
276 Haley, Antitrust Sanctions & Remedies, supra note 274, at 487.
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measures are particularly compelling. Criminal sanctions, as ex-
plained above, 277 have little impact on corporate decision-making.
Similarly, administrative fines do not restrain corporations from con-
travening the AML because the relatively low values of fines convert
them into mere costs of doing business.278
However, the efficacy of remedial measures is reinforced
through the threat of adverse publicity. This is the one outcome of
an antitrust action that may seriously harm an accused company.2 79
Publicity may ignite a response from the public in the form of con-
sumer pressure or, in the extreme, consumer boycott. The more
likely source of pressure, however, is the relevant economic ministry
who may exercise severely constraining administrative guidance.280
In either case, companies engaged in anticompetitive activities may
be pressured to comply with FTC remedial measures in order to
avoid the deleterious effects of negative publicity.
V. Conclusion
This analysis indicates that American hopes for dismantling the
keiretsu through the rigid application of competition law are mis-
placed. Even if the conduct of individual keiretsu is found to reduce
277 See supra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
278 Since 1977, administrative fines under Section 97 are limited in value to 500,000
yen. Haley, Antitrust Sanctions & Remedies, supra note 274, at 488.
279 See id. at 506-08 (discussing use of adverse publicity as a means of enforcing Japa-
nese antitrust sanctions).
280 Administrative guidance is used by many government agencies as an instrument of
leverage to achieve the goals of government policy. The process consists of an agency
making a request of, or giving guidance to, an entity within its jurisdiction, according to
established laws. This is done in order to achieve some administrative objective.
Although this type of guidance seems arbitrary, and therefore contrary to the Rule of Law,
it is not in Japan. Administrative guidance is often explicitly authorized by statute. If a
statute does not refer to this type of guidance, it may still be used; the law establishing
each of the ministries allows them to take actions necessary to achieve governmental
objectives, within the parameters acceptable under Japanese law and within the areas of
their jurisdiction. Japanese courts have ruled administrative guidance permissible in lim-
ited circumstances. Japan v. Idemitsu Kosan, K.K., 985 Hanji 3 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 26,
1980), translated in J. Mark Ramseyer, The Oil Cartel Criminal Cases: Translations and Postscript,
15 L. JAPAN 57, 66 (1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 1108 Hanji 3 (Japan Sup. Ct., Feb.
24, 1984);Japan v. Sekiyu Renmei, 983 Hanji 22 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 26, 1980), trans-
lated in Ramseyer, supra, at 57. In these decisions, which are commonly known as the "Oil
Cartel Cases", administrative guidance, even without explicit authorization, was found
legal so long as the guidelines were reasonable and oppressive methods were not used.
Idemitsu Kosan, 985 Hanji at 3; Sekiyu Renmei, 983 Hanji at 3.
Cultural preference for conciliation and consensualism and governmental desire for
the preservation of flexibility in the implementation of the law foster this practice. The
non-entrenchment of a required pattern of enforcement in a more coercive legal form
allows authorities a great degree of maneuverability in administration. For greater discus-
sion of the legal nature of Japanese administrative guidance, see Meryll Dean, Administra-
tive Guidance in Japanese Law: A Threat to the Rule of Law, 1991 J. Bus. LAw 398 (1991); Yuko
Inoue, Fair Trade Commission: Will Japan's Corporate Watchdog Finally Learn to Bark?, JAPAN
ECON.J., Apr. 14, 1990, at 6; Matsushita, supra note 143, at 552-53; Mitsuo Matsushita, The
Legal Framework of Trade and Investment in Japan, 27 HARVARD IN'r'L L.J. 361 (1986).
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market access for potential new entrants, a successful challenge us-
ing the provisions of the AML would by no means be assured. This
situation is evidence not of excessively loose Japanese law, but rather
of the general absence of anticompetitive elements from keiretsu
transactions.
FTC reluctance to challenge many keiretsu practices is founded
on an implicit recognition of the economic efficiency attainable
through the mechanism of the keiretsu. This efficiency, achieved by
the escalation of interbrand competition, enables the fulfillment of
certain objectives of competition law, including improved consumer
welfare. The recognition of the value of increased interbrand com-
petition is increasingly incorporated into the judicial analysis of com-
petition law, both in Japan and in the United States. Judgments
increasingly accept the reduction of intrabrand competition in af-
firming the facilitation of heightened interbrand competition.28'
Although the efficiency of the keiretsu reduces the potential utility
of competition law, it indicates other possible courses for new en-
trants to follow in the Japanese market. Because firms, whetherJapa-
nese or American, cannot compete with the more efficient keiretsu
firms, they must adopt different strategies. Options for them include
nonentry or retreat from the Japanese market, participation in ex-
isting keiretsu, or establishment of proprietary keiretsu.
It is unclear which of the last two options promises the greater
likelihood of success. The former depends entirely on the willing-
ness of the keiretsu to open up to non-keiretsu firms, whether foreign
or domestic. 28 2 This will happen in a widespread manner only if the
non-keiretsu firms invest substantial sums in order to establish pro-
duction plants in sufficient proximity to the central firms so as to
enable the reliable integration of efficient production of sufficient
281 The recent Kodak decision in the United States does not negate this trend. East-
man Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2092 (1992). Economic
analysis played an important role in the decision; however, economic theory was not per-
mitted to overcome specific record evidence to the contrary in a motion for summary judg-
ment. The Court recognized the existence of a triable issue of fact as a result and denied
the motion. Id.
282 A willingness by keiretsu manufacturers to purchase from non-keiretsu suppliers has
recently been indicated by Japanese automobile manufacturers. Toyota Motor Corpora-
tion recently decided to purchase components from Hitachi Ltd., a member of the rival
Nissan Motor Corporation keiretsu. Toyota to Launch Cross-Keiretsu Purchase from Hitachi, NIK-
KEI NEws BULLETIN, Jan. 20, 1992. Nissan, too, has recently opened its keiretsu to outsid-
ers; it now includes two U.S. firms, Garrett Turbo Inc. and Texas Instruments Japan Ltd.
Satoshi Isaka, Nissan Paves a New Road for Foreign Parts Suppliers, JAPAN ECON. J., May 18,
1991, at 1. These keiretsu purchases are touted as signs of the new openness of corporate
Japan; more likely, they are exceptions that affirm the general rule. The willingness that
Japanese car companies have recently shown to import American cars and car parts are
almost entirely the result of administrative guidance and foreign pressure. There is little
within the keiretsu structure that would motivate these purchases, as they do not facilitate
keiretsu-based practices of total quality management and just in time inventory. See Toyota to
Launch Cross-Keiretsu Purchase from Hitachi, supra; Isaka, supra, at 1.
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quality. The latter option involves only the entering firm, but re-
quires substantial investment in the simultaneous entry into several
markets. This expenditure may, however, be minimized through the
utilization, like existing keiretsu, of mechanisms which are either bind-
ing or restrictive. In either case, the keiretsu must be viewed with ad-
miration, and not with trepidation. Rather than advocating the
dismantling of the keiretsu, American policy-makers should foster the
emulation of the beneficial features of these distinctive corporate
groups.

